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Part I
Introduction
Due to increasing life expectancies and decreasing birth rates, the world
population is aging. However, demographic structures differ widely across
regions. Figure I.1 shows the development of the median age in more devel-
oped relative to less developed regions (using a United Nations definition)
over the period from 1950 to 2010. Although the median age has been in-
creasing faster in the less developed than in the more developed regions since
1970 (resulting in the decline in the relative median age shown in figure I.1),
the more developed regions’ populations are still much older: for 2010 the
median age in the more developed regions was estimated to be 39.7, whereas
its estimate in the less developed regions was only 26.8.1
Figure I.1: Median Age, More Developed Relative to Less Developed Regions
Source: UNPD (2008). The category “more developed regions” includes Europe, Northern America,
Australia, New Zealand and Japan. The category “less developed regions” includes all other countries.
Population aging affects labor, capital and goods markets.2 It also poses
a strain on social security systems. In particular it challenges the financial
viability of unfunded pension systems in the more developed countries since
the number of contributors declines relative to the number of beneficiaries.
1UNPD (2008)
2These effects of population aging are discussed extensively in Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004).
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Immigration is often seen as one key instrument to counteract this negative
fiscal consequence of demographic change. The United Nations’ report on
replacement migration (UNPD 2001) shows that it can hardly be the only
solution: in order to keep the ratio of 15 to 64 year olds to over 64 year
olds in the United States constant until 2050, immigration would have to be
about 16 times its forecast. Immigration to the 15 “old” European Union
countries with their less favorable demographic structure would even have
to increase by a factor of over 60. This larger increase is also due to the
fact that forecasted immigration to the European Union is much lower than
forecasted immigration to the United States.
Increasing the number of admitted immigrants can still be part of a wider
set of solutions, including pension reform. Various studies estimate a positive
fiscal impact of increases in immigration, see, e.g., Storesletten (2000) for the
US or Bonin et al. (2000) for Germany. The size of the effect is contingent
on immigrant characteristics. A stronger positive effect can be expected
if immigrants are selected according to age and skill. Fehr et al. (2004,
2005) also show that the impact of increases in immigration on the welfare of
natives is contingent on host country characteristics: a more positive impact
is estimated for the European Union as compared to the United States and
Japan because of its higher tax rates.
Furthermore, the marked differences in demographic structures between
regions add to the large potential efficiency gains from international trade,
capital investment in less developed regions and labor migration to more
developed regions.3 Whereas the global markets for goods and capital are
by now as integrated as they were before World War I, see, e.g., Hatton
and Williamson (2005, p. 225), the same is not true for labor markets.
Hatton and Williamson (2005, ch. 17) conclude that even modest increases
in migration would induce large gains in terms of world income.
The incentives to migrate from the less developed to the more developed
regions are strong: after adjusting for differences in purchasing power, gross
national income (GNI) in the less developed regions was still only about
8, 000$ in 2010, compared to 28, 000$ in the more developed regions.4 The
income difference between more and less developed regions has even increased
over the last 30 years. Whereas GNI per capita in the less developed regions
is now less than a fourth of that in the more developed regions, it amounted
to a third of that in the more developed regions in 1980, see figure I.2.
If increasing labor migration would induce income gains for the world as
3Investigations dealing with the impact of population aging on international capital
flows are INGENUE (2001), Brooks (2003) or Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2006).
4World Bank (2010)
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Figure I.2: Gross National Income Per Capita, Normalized
Source: World Bank (2010). In order to match the United Nations’ definition, the category “more de-
veloped regions” includes Europe, Northern America, Australia, New Zealand and Japan whereas the
category “less developed regions” includes all other countries. GNI per capita in the more developed
regions in 1980 was normalized to 100.
a whole and especially for the migrants, the question arises which mobility
barriers limit migration. Restrictive immigration policies in the more de-
veloped regions currently seem to play a major role in limiting labor flows,
see, e.g., Facchini and Mayda (2008) or Hatton and Williamson (2005, ch.
11). These politically induced mobility barriers are at the core of this the-
sis. Policy outcomes, in turn, depend crucially on voters’ preferences in any
democracy. However, voters in the more developed countries do not have
homogeneous preferences with regard to immigration. This thesis models
differences in immigration preferences that arise along demographic lines,
and their translation into policy.
An increase in the population share of old individuals is likely to increase
those individuals’ political weight. Therefore, a key question analyzed in
this thesis is how young and old individuals differ with respect to their im-
migration preferences. First of all, young and old are affected differently
by immigration because their factor endowments differ. Young individuals
who work are more likely to view labor immigration negatively than older
individuals who have accumulated substantial amounts of capital. This is
because immigrants tend to be young themselves. Immigrants who expand
the domestic labor force are therefore complements to native workers and
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substitutes to capital employed in production, at least to a certain degree.
Furthermore, old individuals rely more heavily on social security sys-
tems. The design of social security systems determines whether recipients or
contributors benefit more strongly from an increase in the number of contrib-
utors. With defined benefits in a pension system native workers benefit from
sharing the burden of pension contributions with immigrant workers. With
defined contribution rates pensioners are more likely to benefit, although
wages, from which pensions are financed, decline. Finally, non-monetary
factors may also shape young and old individuals’ immigration attitudes dif-
ferently. For instance, younger individuals may be more open to changes in
social norms and customs induced by immigration.
This thesis is divided into four essays which are centered around one
common political economy perspective. The first three essays construct the-
oretical economic models of endogenous immigration policy. The last essay
is an empirical investigation of the impact of age on individual immigration
attitudes.
Essays number one and two set up dynamic models of immigration policy
in an aging country. As an extension, they also consider the simultaneous
determination of immigration and pension policies. They investigate how
the impact of immigration on factor prices (and on the parameters of the
pension system) translates into immigration policy.
Several previous investigations analyze endogenously determined immi-
gration policy in static settings (see Benhabib 1996 and Mazza and van
Winden 1996) or in settings with myopic individuals (see Scholten and Thum
1996). Dynamic investigations related to this essay are, for instance, Haupt
and Peters (1998), Dolmas and Huffman (2004), Ortega (2005, 2010), and
Sand and Razin (2007). An important insight derived from dynamic analyses
of immigration policy is that individuals do not necessarily favor the admis-
sion of immigrants who are different from themselves, as predicted by static
models. The reason is that, unless immigration is temporary, immigrants’
preferences may influence policies in future periods. For instance, low skilled
immigrants are likely to endorse income redistribution.
The investigations by Haupt and Peters (1998) and Sand and Razin (2007)
are closest in spirit to the first two essays of this thesis since they examine
immigration policy in the light of demographic change, employing a Markov
politico-economic equilibrium concept as defined in Krusell et al. (1997)
and in Forni (2005), with fully rational voters and sequentially determined
policies. Furthermore, they rely on overlapping generations models. To cap-
ture the possibly heterogeneous interests of individuals at different stages of
their life cycle, it is necessary to model different generations living simulta-
neously rather than one representative consumer. This approach traces back
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to Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965).
The first two essays in this thesis also employ a Markov politico-equilibrium
concept and use overlapping generations models. They differ from the studies
by Haupt and Peters (1998) and Sand and Razin (2007) in their assumption
concerning the translation of preferences into policy. The former postulate a
representative democracy government maximizing an objective function that
accounts for the welfare of all contemporaneously living voters instead of ac-
counting for the welfare of the median voter only, as in Haupt and Peters
(1998) and Sand and Razin (2007). Employing such an objective function,
which can be motivated from a probabilistic voting framework as in Lind-
beck and Weibull (1987) or Coughlin et al. (1990), captures the gradual shift
in immigration policy resulting from population aging.5 In a median voter
framework, population aging may induce radical shifts in immigration pol-
icy from the young to the old generation’s preferred policy. Given that the
median voter’s identity does not change, it may also imply that immigration
policy is not altered by population aging.
The first essay (Aging, Factor Returns, and Immigration Policy) makes
the simplifying assumption that immigrants have the same number of off-
spring as natives. This assumption makes it possible to solve the model
analytically for an infinite time horizon. However, it eliminates any effect
of immigration on the political balance between young and old voters in the
next period. As a result, the equilibrium immigration rate is time-invariant.
The key finding is that aging increases the demand for immigration.
The second essay (Aging and Immigration Policy in a Representative
Democracy) is an extension of the first, as it allows for a higher number
of offspring among immigrants. A two-period version of the model is solved
numerically. This yields additional insights with respect to the channels
through which immigration affects future policy. In particular, immigration
in the first period increases the political weight of the young generation in the
second period. Consequently, the immigration rates in the two periods are
substitutes, even though aging initially enhances immigration. Furthermore,
immigration and social security policies are interdependent.
The third essay (Why Don’t Labor and Capital Flow Between Young and
Old Countries? ) deviates from the previous literature in a different direc-
tion. It is novel in modeling the interplay between policies which determine
international labor and capital flows. It is based on a static setting with two
countries. As in the first two essays, a young and an old generation with
heterogeneous interests live simultaneously. The two countries differ with
5This kind of government objective function is employed by Mazza and van Winden
(1996) to analyze immigration policy and by Lorz (2004) to analyze redistribution policy.
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respect to their demographic structure and with respect to their total factor
productivity. Capital flows are assumed to be limited by the possibility of
expropriation in the (younger) developing destination country. The mere pos-
sibility of expropriation reduces capital flows in Why Don’t Labor and Capital
Flow Between Young and Old Countries?, even though expropriation does
not actually take place.
This third essay is thus closely related to the literature on the impedi-
ments to capital flows, see, for instance, Lucas (1990) or Alfaro et al. (2008).
Eaton and Gersovitz (1984), Cole and English (1991) and Thomas and Wor-
rall (1994) deal explicitly with the expropriation risk of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI). The simultaneous consideration of immigration and expropria-
tion policies yields new insights: in particular, migration and FDI need not
be substitutes if both kinds of factor flows are limited by policy. Depending
on the translation of preferences into policy, emigration from a developing
country may instead reduce expropriation incentives there and thereby raise
capital flows to developing countries.6
The third essay also presumes that economically, older individuals in more
developed countries benefit more strongly from immigration than do younger
ones. Yet previous empirical research has found opposition to immigration
to increase with age. This holds for the investigations by Chandler and
Tsai (2001) for the US, by Tucci (2005) for Germany, and by O’Rourke and
Sinnott (2006) and Facchini and Mayda (2009) who use international data.
However, age as a determinant of immigration attitudes is not at the center
of the analysis of the mentioned investigations.
The fourth and last essay of this thesis (Population Aging and Individual
Attitudes toward Immigration: Disentangling Age, Cohort and Time Effects)
is an empirical investigation of immigration attitudes which focuses on the
impact of age, and also accounts for economic and non-economic individual
characteristics correlated with age. The data used stem from the German
Socio-Economic Panel, a large representative longitudinal survey of private
households in Germany. An unbalanced panel of all German voters who were
ever interviewed on their immigration attitudes is constructed.
One recent study (Ivlevs ) explicitly takes into account the impact of pop-
ulation aging. Other studies, as, for instance, Bauer et al. (2000), Dustmann
and Preston (2005) and Facchini and Mayda (2009), account for labor market
and welfare state concerns, which are related to individual age. The impor-
tance of non-economic factors is discussed extensively in Mayda (2006), but
6This is the case in the median voter framework employed in this essay. If, however, the
government accounts for the welfare of all generations in its objective function, a decline
in the population share of young workers enhances expropriation incentives, see Harms
and an de Meulen ().
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also in Chandler and Tsai (2001) and Dustmann and Preston (2007). The
contribution of this last essay is the separation of the effect of individual age
from cohort effects, a differentiation which can only be achieved by using
panel data. The essay presents evidence for distinct effects of an individuals’
year of birth and stage in the life cycle on attitudes toward immigration.
Relative to other areas of concern, concerns about immigration do in fact
decrease over the life cycle. The results also suggest that representative
democracy governments admit more immigrants as their voting populations
age.
In summary, the four essays in this thesis focus on the demand for immi-
gration. Their aim is to discern the impact of individuals and populations
growing older on immigration preferences and immigration policies. Econom-
ically, older individuals are found to benefit more strongly from immigration.
However, non-economic factors are also key in explaining immigration pref-
erences.
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Part II
Aging, Factor Returns, and
Immigration Policy
Lena Calahorrano and Oliver Lorza
Abstract
Immigration has various economic and non-economic effects on the
destination country’s inhabitants. In this paper we focus on the im-
pact of immigration on factor returns and analyze how aging affects
immigration policy, employing a dynamic political-economy model of
representative democracy. Aging, i.e. a decline in the growth rate
of the native population, has an expansionary effect on immigration
in this framework. This immigration effect may even overcompensate
the initial contraction of the labor force. We show that the immi-
gration rate in the representative democracy equilibrium exceeds the
immigration rate which would maximize welfare of current and future
generations and also discuss the influence of social security on immi-
gration policy.
JEL classification: D78, F22, J10
Keywords: Demographic change, political economy, immigration pol-
icy
aRWTH Aachen University, Faculty of Business and Economics, Templergraben 64,
52062 Aachen, Germany, phone: ++49 241 80 93931, fax: ++49 241 80 693931, email:
lorz@rwth-aachen.de.
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1 Introduction
Virtually all industrialized countries are facing a decline in birth rates and an
increase in life expectancy resulting in a substantial aging of the native pop-
ulation. Immigration is often seen as one key instrument to counteract this
development (see, e.g., UNPD 2001). Against this background, our paper
analyzes how countries adjust their immigration policy in the wake of de-
mographic change. Point of departure is a standard overlapping generations
economy with two generations, young and old. Immigration affects factor
incomes of both generations differently, as the capital income of the old gen-
eration increases whereas the labor income of the young generation declines
if immigrant workers expand the domestic labor pool. Consequently, old and
young have different interests with regard to the desired level of immigra-
tion. Although capital movements and trade may dampen the influence of
immigration on factor prices, neither capital nor goods are perfectly mobile
internationally, and there is indeed empirical evidence showing that immigra-
tion reduces wages or employment among native workers in the destination
countries (see, e.g., Borjas 2003 or Angrist and Kugler 2003).
To determine the equilibrium policy, we consider a dynamic model of
representative democracy. The government sets the immigration level in
each period to maximize aggregate welfare of both currently living genera-
tions, weighting each generation proportionally to its share in the population.
Such an approach to modeling policy outcomes in representative democra-
cies, which can be derived from probabilistic voting models, has become
common by now.1 Due to its effects on factor accumulation, immigration
not only influences current welfare but also has consequences for later pe-
riods. Therefore, immigration policy constitutes a sequential game between
subsequent governments. We derive the Markov-perfect equilibrium of this
game and analyze how a decline in the rate of population growth influences
the equilibrium level of immigration. In addition to the effects on factor
incomes mentioned above, we also allow for non-monetary costs of immigra-
tion, which capture the often observed reluctance of the native population
to admit foreigners as permanent immigrants.
In our model, a Markov-perfect equilibrium exists in which the number of
immigrants relative to the domestic workforce is stationary. The equilibrium
immigration rate is positive as long as the population is sufficiently old and
the non-monetary costs of immigration are low. With regard to the effects of
aging on immigration policy, we can show that the government allows more
1For textbook treatments, see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2000, ch. 3 or Mueller 2003,
ch. 12.
15
immigrants if the growth rate of the native population declines. This results
from the increase in the relative size of the old generation, which benefits from
immigration, in the electorate. Because of this expansionary effect of aging
on immigration, the relationship between aging, factor intensities and factor
prices is not as clear-cut as in a standard growth model without immigration.
Instead, the influence of the growth rate of the native population on the total
size of the labor force and on the capital intensity may be non-monotonic.
Our paper builds on a few related approaches dealing with the political
economy of immigration policy. Benhabib (1996) examines immigration pol-
icy in a median voter model with heterogeneous wealth endowments. Mazza
and van Winden (1996) analyze redistribution and immigration policies un-
der representative democracy with workers and capital owners. Unlike our
paper, the models of Benhabib (1996) and Mazza and van Winden (1996)
are entirely static and therefore do not account for intertemporal effects of
immigration policy we focus on. Dolmas and Huffman (2004) and Ortega
(2005, 2010) consider the interplay between policies concerning immigra-
tion and income redistribution. As immigrants may differ from the native
population with respect to their wealth endowments or skill levels, allowing
more immigration may change political majorities with respect to redistribu-
tion policies. Dolmas and Huffman (2004) and Ortega (2005, 2010) analyze
how this effect influences equilibrium immigration policy employing a median
voter framework.
Sand and Razin (2007) deal with the influence of aging on immigration
and social security policies. They set up a median-voter model with two
overlapping generations and assume that immigrants have more children than
the native population. Immigration alters the population shares of both
generations in the subsequent period, which may have consequences for the
identity of the median voter (old or young). Sand and Razin (2007) show
that several equilibrium types may emerge in this setting, depending on the
growth rate of the native and of the immigrant population. Earlier related
papers that rely on the median-voter approach are Scholten and Thum (1996)
and Haupt and Peters (1998).
In a median voter model, population aging may have drastic consequences
for immigration policy, as it may lead from an immigration level character-
ized by the preferences of the young to the implementation of the old genera-
tion’s most preferred policies, namely maximum immigration and a tax rate
which maximizes social security revenues. In contrast to this rather extreme
outcome, our paper is able to capture the gradual shift in political weights
toward the old generation which results from a decline in population growth.2
2Amegashie (2004), Facchini and Willmann (2005), and Epstein and Nitzan (2006)
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2 Equilibrium Immigration Policy
Our economic framework is a standard overlapping-generations model with
workers and retirees. In each period t, competitive firms produce a single
aggregate good with a Cobb-Douglas technology
Yt = K
α
t L
1−α
t .
The workforce Lt is composed of native workers Nt and immigrants, i.e.
Lt = Nt(1 + γt), where γt ≥ 0 is the ratio of immigrants per native worker.
We assume that immigrants have the same labor productivity as native work-
ers. This assumption simplifies the exposition but is not important for our
qualitative results. A lower labor productivity of immigrants could easily
be incorporated into the model by weighting the immigration rate with a
productivity term less than unity.3 Capital is given by past domestic savings
and depreciates completely after one period. With k˜t ≡ Kt/Nt as the capital
endowment per native worker, factor returns for labor and capital are given
by
wt = (1− α)k˜αt (1 + γt)−α and 1 + rt = αk˜α−1t (1 + γt)1−α . (1)
Young individuals in period t supply one unit of labor and allocate their
wage income wt to consumption and savings. Old individuals are retired and
consume all of their wealth st−1 (1 + rt) generated from previous savings.
Utility of young and old individuals is given by
U ot = ln c
o
t − ψγt and
Uyt = ln c
y
t + β ln c
o
t+1 − ψγt − βψγt+1 ,
respectively. This logarithmic specification of utility, together with the as-
sumed Cobb-Douglas technology, allows an analytical closed-form solution
of our model. The terms cot and c
y
t denote the consumption levels of the
old and young, respectively, and ψγt captures non-monetary costs related to
immigration (ψ > 0). These costs represent negative sentiments toward im-
migration or negative welfare effects of immigration that are not accounted
for in individual incomes.4 For example, the native population may be reluc-
tant to accommodate to different social norms and customs of immigrants,
immigration may reduce the utility derived from local public goods (as in
set-up interest group models of immigration.
3As we assume full employment, welfare migration, which would represent an economic
burden for all natives in the destination country, is not an issue in our model.
4See Hillman (2002), Hansen (2003), Krieger (2005), or Verbon and Meijdam (2008)
for similar specifications.
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Alesina and La Ferrara 2005), it may cause congestion effects in the host
country or additional costs to the welfare system. The parameter ψ allows
us to capture these different factors in a tractable and straightforward way.
Accounting for non-monetary costs of immigration further ensures an interior
solution for the equilibrium immigration policy. Empirically, non-economic
effects of immigration play an important role in shaping attitudes toward
immigration, see, e.g., O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006) and Mayda (2006). To
focus on the economic determinants of migration policy, we assume for the
time being the same cost term ψ for young and old individuals. At the
end of this section, we discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption.
Note that the young generation also anticipates non-monetary costs of future
immigration ψγt+1 in addition to immigration costs in t.
The budget constraint of a young individual is given by
cyt +
cot+1
1 + rt+1
= wt .
Maximizing the utility of the young subject to their budget constraint
yields the individual savings and consumption levels
st =
β
1 + β
wt , c
y
t =
1
1 + β
wt , and c
o
t+1 =
β
1 + β
wt (1 + rt+1) . (2)
Since k˜t+1 = st/(1+n), the capital stock per native worker evolves according
to
k˜t+1 =
β(1− α)k˜αt (1 + γt)−α
(1 + n)(1 + β)
. (3)
Immigration in our model is permanent, and immigrants gain the right to
vote after one period in the host country. We assume that immigrants have
the same number of children as natives, and that immigrants’ children are
fully integrated into the economy. For a discussion of the effects of different
birth rates, see our concluding remarks.5 With a population growth rate of
n (n > −1) we have Nt = (1 + n)Lt−1 = (1 + n) (1 + γt−1)Nt−1.
To derive the political economy equilibrium in this setting, we assume a
representative democracy in which the government accounts for the welfare
5Empirical research has shown that labor market outcomes of second-generation immi-
grants fall short of those of natives (see, e.g., Algan et al. 2010). In our model, a worse
labor market performance of immigrants’ children would aggravate the opposition of the
young generation against immigration whereas the preferences of the old generation with
respect to immigration would be unchanged. The central mechanism of our model, the
conflict between young and old generation with regard to the preferred immigration rate,
would remain in such an extension.
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of the young and the old generation in its objective function. More precisely,
we assume that the government in period t sets γt to maximize
Wt = V
o
t + (1 + n)V
y
t , (4)
with V ot and V
y
t as the indirect utilities of old and young. In (4) the size of
the old generation is normalized to one, and the young generation’s welfare is
weighted with its size relative to the old generation. As is well known, such an
objective function, which incorporates the welfare of all voter groups instead
of only the median, can be motivated by a probabilistic voting framework
(see, e.g., Lindbeck and Weibull 1987 or Coughlin et al. 1990). An equal
welfare weight of all individuals in the government’s objective function is the
outcome of a probabilistic voting model if the degree of uncertainty about
individual voting behavior does not differ between groups. However, our
model can easily be extended to incorporate different welfare weights of young
and old individuals, e.g. due to lobbying of interest groups, as in Facchini
and Mayda (2008).
The sequence of events is as follows: At the beginning of each period t
the respective government decides about the immigration rate γt, production
takes place after immigration, and finally young individuals decide how to
allocate their wage income to consumption and savings.
We refer to the concept of Markov-perfect equilibrium to find an equi-
librium of this game between successive governments (as in Krusell et al.
1997 or Forni 2005). More specifically, we search for a policy rule γ(k˜) such
that γt = γ(k˜t) maximizes W (k˜t, γt, k˜t+1, γt+1). The same optimal policy
rule has to specify the immigration rate γt+1 in the following period, i.e.
γt+1 = γ(k˜t+1), and equation (3) has to determine the intertemporal accu-
mulation of capital k˜t+1 = k˜t+1(k˜t, γt). In our model specification, we can
show that a very simple policy with the property dγ/dk˜ = 0 constitutes such
a Markov-perfect equilibrium.
Young and old have conflicting preferences concerning immigration: On
the one hand, an increase in the immigration rate γt raises the return on
capital and thereby the income of the old. On the other hand, the wage rate
and thereby the income of the young generation declines if more immigrants
are allowed to enter the country.6 Setting ∂γt+1/∂k˜t+1 = 0, we can derive the
following effects of raising the immigration rate on individual consumption
levels:
dcot
dγt
=
1− α
1 + γt
cot ,
dcyt
dγt
= − α
1 + γt
cyt , and
dcot+1
dγt
= − α
2
1 + γt
cot+1 . (5)
6Since individuals react to a declining wage rate by lowering their savings, this negative
effect is partly offset by an increase of future capital returns.
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The marginal indirect utilities of both generations are then given by:
dV ot
dγt
=
1− α
1 + γt
− ψ and dV
y
t
dγt
= −α(1 + αβ)
1 + γt
− ψ . (6)
According to equation (6), marginal utilities in period t do not depend
on the state variable k˜t. Taking the first derivative of Wt and inserting (6),
we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 A Markov-perfect equilibrium exists, and the immigration
rate in this equilibrium is given by
γ = max
(
0;
1− α− (1 + n)α(1 + αβ)
(2 + n)ψ
− 1
)
. (7)
The equilibrium policy rule as specified in Proposition 1 satisfies our
previous conjecture dγ/dk˜ = 0. Equilibrium immigration policy is thus time-
invariant. For a further interpretation of the equilibrium policy, we focus on
the interior solution with γ > 0. This is the case, if the term ψ, which
determines non-monetary immigration costs, is sufficiently small and if the
population growth rate n is sufficiently small. For all γ > 0, we find that the
equilibrium immigration rate is negatively related to population growth, i.e.
dγ/dn < 0. This is because the political weight of the old generation, which
benefits from immigration in our model, decreases with n. Population aging
– a decline of the population growth rate n – thus leads to more immigration.
Immigration also declines in the capital share α and in the discount factor β.
Intuitively, the positive impact of immigration on the old generation’s income
is stronger the higher the capital share whereas a high discount factor implies
a high utility weight of the young generation who is against immigration.
The immigration effect of aging also has consequences for the growth
rate l of the labor force in the immigration country. This growth rate is
determined by 1 + l = (1 + γ)(1 +n). Inserting for γ from (7) and taking the
derivative yields
dl
dn
=
1− α− [(2 + n)2 − 1]α (1 + αβ)
(2 + n)2 ψ
. (8)
Thus,
dl
dn
R 0 iff (2 + n)2 Q 1 + α
2β
α + α2β
. (9)
According to (9), the growth rate of the labor force does not necessarily
increase with n if immigration policy is endogenous. Only if n is very small,
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the influence of n on l is positive. For larger n, however, we may obtain a
negative relationship between n and l. The effect of aging on immigration
policy is so strong in this case that it outweighs the initial decline of native
population growth. To be more specific, let us consider numerical values of
α = 0.35 and β = 0.75.7 With these values we obtain dl/dn < 0 for all
n > −0.43. That is, for any reasonable value of the population growth rate
our model predicts a negative relationship between population growth and
labor force growth. Aging then results in a higher labor supply.
The capital intensity per worker (native and immigrant), i.e. kt ≡ Kt/Lt
or kt = k˜t/ (1 + γ), can be obtained from (3). Setting kt = kt+1, we can
determine the steady state k∗ as
k∗ =
(
β(1− α)
(1 + β)(1 + l)
) 1
1−α
. (10)
In a standard growth model with an exogenous immigration rate, the
influence of population growth on k∗ is clearly negative, and aging results in
capital deepening, causing the wage rate to increase and the capital return
to decline. With endogenous immigration, there is now an additional effect
of aging on k∗ via the chosen immigration rate: an aging population admits
a larger number of immigrants.
Figure II.1 illustrates the relationship between n and k∗ in our model for
α = 0.35, β = 0.75 and ψ = 0.1. Since dl/dn > 0 for small n, the capital
intensity first declines with n. If, however, n exceeds a certain threshold
value, determined by the equality in (9), the capital intensity increases if
n rises. Finally, the population share of the young may be so high as to
impede any immigration. In this case, we have γ = 0 instead of an interior
equilibrium with immigration. Then the effect of n on γ vanishes, causing
the capital intensity to fall in the population growth rate as in a model with
exogenous immigration policy. This last threshold depends on the level of
the non-monetary immigration costs. The lower ψ, the further the critical
population growth rate is shifted to the right.
Our previous analysis assumed that the non-monetary costs related to
immigration are the same for young and old individuals. To show that our
main conclusions survive a deviation from this assumption, we can also derive
7For instance, Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2003), who carefully motivate the choice of different
parameter values for their policy simulations, let the production share of capital vary
between 0.3 and 0.4. According to Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2003) a common assumption for
the annual discount rate of households is 0.01. If it is assumed that each of the two life
periods lasts for 30 years, this corresponds to a discount factor β of about 0.75.
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Figure II.1: Population Growth and Steady State Capital Intensity
the equilibrium immigration rate for the case ψy 6= ψo. It is given by
γ = max
(
0;
1− α− (1 + n)α(1 + αβ)
ψo + (1 + n)ψy
− 1
)
(11)
instead of equation (7). Clearly, immigration now declines in both genera-
tions’ non-monetary immigration costs and is positive only if none of these
are too large. The government’s preferred level of immigration is still higher
the older the population, even if pensioners are more averse to changes in
social norms than workers are. Furthermore, immigration still counteracts
the negative effect of population aging on labor force growth, as long as the
immigration rate is positive, i.e. dγ/dn < 0 for γ > 0.
Note that the immigration rate in all periods is higher than the rate which
would maximize welfare of current and future, yet unborn generations. In
period t, a social welfare function can be defined as the discounted sum of
all current and future native generation’s utilities:
SWFt =
∞∑
s=t
(1 + n)s−tβs−t{ln cos + (1 + n) ln cys − (2 + n)ψγs} , (12)
In this social welfare function, the individual discount factor is also used to
discount future consumption streams, and each generation is weighted with
its size relative to the first generation. The solution to the maximization of
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this function is given by
γSW = max
(
0;
1− αβ(1 + n)− α(2 + n)
(1− αβ(1 + n)) (2 + n)ψ − 1
)
. (13)
Comparing γSW with the equilibrium immigration rate γ yields γ > γSW
in an interior equilibrium. Immigration under representative democracy is
too high from a social welfare viewpoint. The reason is an intergenerational
externality: More immigration in period t causes a decline in capital accu-
mulation, which has a negative effect on future generations’ wages.
For a further interpretation, we may also compare our equilibrium with
the outcome in a median voter setting. The equilibrium policy in a me-
dian voter model either maximizes the welfare of the young (for n > 0) or
of the old generation. As young voters are against immigration, we have
a Markov-perfect equilibrium with zero immigration in a median voter set-
ting for n > 0. For n < 0, the equilibrium immigration rate is given by
γM = max (0; (1− α)ψ−1 − 1). As long as the identity of the median voter
remains unchanged, aging does not influence immigration policy at all in
such a setting. This prediction of the median voter approach differs sharply
from our model of representative democracy in which the immigration rate
varies continuously with the rate of population growth n.
3 Social Security
Since aging implies a higher old-age dependency ratio, immigration is often
seen as a (partial) solution to the problem of sustaining an unfunded social
security system. To investigate how immigration policy in a representative
democracy is related to social security, we now introduce intergenerational
transfers into our model. We assume that in each period the government
simultaneously sets the immigration rate γt and the rate of social security
contributions τt raised from labor income of the young. Revenues from social
security contributions are used to finance benefits bt to the old generation.
With social security, net wages of the young are thus given by wt(1 − τt),
and the balanced budget constraint btLt−1 = τtwtLt determines benefits as
bt = τtwt(1 + lt).
For a given contribution rate, an increase in the number of contributors
due to more immigration raises social security benefits that can be paid
to the old generation. One might expect that this effect causes a positive
relationship between optimal benefits and optimal immigration, implying a
higher immigration rate than in a world without social security. However, as
we show in the following, this is not the case in our model. Given the assumed
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parametrization of utility and production technology, we find instead that
chosen immigration and social security policies are independent from each
other if the government sets social security contributions in addition to the
immigration rate. Consequently, with a social security system in place, the
same immigration rate as in our baseline model constitutes an equilibrium.
With social security, individuals face the intertemporal budget constraint
cyt +
cot+1
1 + rt+1
= wt(1− τt) + bt+1
1 + rt+1
, (14)
and optimal consumption and savings are given by
st =
β
1 + β
wt(1− τt)− 1
1 + β
bt+1
1 + rt+1
,
cyt =
1
1 + β
[
wt(1− τt) + bt+1
1 + rt+1
]
, and
cot+1 =
β
1 + β
(1 + rt+1)
[
wt(1− τt) + bt+1
1 + rt+1
]
. (15)
The government maximizes its objective function (4) with respect to γt
and τt. This determines the equilibrium policy functions γ(k˜t) and τ(k˜t). As
in the case without social security, we can derive a Markov-perfect equilib-
rium in which policies are time-invariant.
Starting from the conjectures dγ/dk˜t = 0 and dτ/dk˜t = 0, we first de-
termine the effects of marginally raising γt and τt on welfare of the old and
the young. With respect to social security benefits for the old generation,
immigration has two effects: On the one hand, it increases the number of
contributors to social security, and on the other hand, it diminishes wages
from which social security contributions are financed. The net effect of im-
migration on social security benefits is clearly positive, however:
dbt
dγt
=
1− α
1 + γt
bt .
In addition to its influence on social security benefits, immigration raises
the capital income of the old as in the baseline model without social security.
The resulting effect of immigration on the consumption level and on welfare
of the old in period t is
dcot
dγt
=
1− α
1 + γt
cot and
dV ot
dγt
=
1− α
1 + γt
− ψ , (16)
just as in the case without social security. Although the income gain from
immigration for the old is higher with a social security system in place – the
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income gain from immigration is proportional to cot – the marginal utility of
income is accordingly lower.
For the young generation’s consumption and welfare the effect of immi-
gration on social security matters. Inserting for bt+1 from the government’s
budget constraint, we can write the discounted value of future benefits as
follows:
bt+1
1 + rt+1
=
1− α
α
(1 + n)τt+1k˜t+1 .
Employing k˜t+1 = st/(1 + n) and st as given by (15) yields
bt+1
1 + rt+1
=
(1− α)βτt+1
α(1 + β) + (1− α)τt+1wt (1− τt) and
k˜t+1 =
αβwt (1− τt)
(1 + n) [α(1 + β) + (1− α)τt+1] . (17)
Setting dτt+1/dk˜t+1 = 0, we obtain
d (bt+1/(1 + rt+1))
dγt
= − α
1 + γt
bt+1
1 + rt+1
and
dk˜t+1
dγt
= − α
1 + γt
k˜t+1 . (18)
That is, the discounted value of future benefits declines with immigration,
because immigration diminishes capital accumulation and thereby raises the
interest rate. With (15) and (18) we obtain the same derivatives
dcyt
dγt
= − α
1 + γt
cyt ,
dcot+1
dγt
= − α
2
1 + γt
cot+1 , and
dV yt
dγt
= −α(1 + αβ)
1 + γt
− ψ (19)
as in the baseline model without social security. Consequently, the equilib-
rium level of immigration is the same as in the case without social security.
Proposition 2 The immigration rate as specified in Proposition 1 also con-
stitutes an equilibrium if a social security system is in place.
Regarding the equilibrium level of social security contributions, young and
old have conflicting interests: the old generation prefers high contributions in
order to raise their social security benefits whereas the welfare of the young
declines in the contribution rate.8 The old’s welfare gain from marginally
raising social security contributions is given by
dV ot
dτt
=
wt(1 + l)
cot
=
bt/τt
cot
. (20)
8Social security benefits rise unambiguously in τt, since labor supply is exogenous.
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For the influence on consumption and welfare of the young we can derive
from (15) and (17) the following terms:
dcyt
dτt
= − 1
1− τt c
y
t ,
dcot+1
dτt
= − α
1− τt c
o
t+1 , and
dV yt
dτt
= −1 + αβ
1− τt . (21)
Given the influence of τt on welfare of both generations (19) and (21), the
equilibrium contribution rate can be determined as follows:9
τ =
1− α− α(1 + n)(1 + αβ)
1− α + (1− α)(1 + n)(1 + αβ) . (22)
Note that τ is smaller than one. Equilibrium social security contributions
decline in the population growth rate n since the share of old individuals
who prefer a high level of social security decreases in n. Contributions also
decline in the capital share α and in the time preference factor β.
We see from this section that, given our model specification, equilibrium
immigration and social security policies are independent of each other. In
contrast to the case of a social security system with fully flexible contributions
and benefits we have considered, social security may influence immigration
policy in a system with exogenous (flat) benefits b. However, given the
experience of substantial pension reforms in the past, it appears to be more
plausible to assume that governments can change social security parameters
over time instead of modeling a rigid social security system with fixed benefits
for all cohorts now and in the future.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have analyzed the effects of population aging on immi-
gration policy in a representative democracy model with two overlapping
generations. The assumptions of logarithmic utility and Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology allowed an analytical closed-form solution of our model. We have
shown that aging, i.e. a decline in population growth, has an expansionary
influence on the chosen immigration level, and that this effect may even over-
compensate the positive impact of aging on the capital intensity. We have
also found that equilibrium immigration policy is time-invariant, and that
the immigration level set by a representative democracy government, which
9Lorz (1999) and Gonzales-Eiras and Niepelt (2007) derive similar results in models
without immigration.
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maximizes the welfare of the currently living generations only, exceeds the
immigration level which would also take into account the welfare of future,
yet unborn generations.
To obtain further insights into the political economy of migration pol-
icy, our analysis may be extended in various directions: For example, one
may distinguish different skill levels of workers and thereby model the dis-
tributional conflict with regard to the desired immigration level not only
between different generations but also within generations between skilled
and unskilled workers. Another extension would involve more general utility
and production functions. With more general functional forms, however, a
closed-form solution as in our baseline model would no longer be possible.
Finally, taking into account that immigrants tend to have more children
than industrialized countries’ natives would introduce additional dynamics
into the model. Immigration would then alter the age composition of the
electorate in subsequent periods.
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Part III
Aging and Immigration Policy
in a Representative Democracy
Lena Calahorrano
Abstract
This paper analyzes how population aging affects immigration pol-
icy in rich industrialized countries. It sets up a two-period model of
a representative democracy with two overlapping generations. The
government’s preferred immigration rate is found to increase with the
share of retirees in the population. The paper differentiates between
an economy without a pension system and one with pay-as-you-go
pensions. The chosen immigration rate is contingent on the design
of the pension system. If pension contributions and benefits are set
freely by the government, equilibrium immigration is lower than it is
in the absence of a pension system. On the contrary, it is higher if the
pension level is fixed ex ante to a relatively generous level, since native
workers then benefit from sharing the burden of pension contributions
with the immigrants.
JEL classification: J1, D78, F22
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1 Introduction
Virtually all industrialized countries are facing a decline in birth rates and an
increase in life expectancy resulting in substantial population aging. Against
this background, the question arises how rich countries adjust their immigra-
tion policies in the wake of demographic change. For instance, the United
Nations’ report on replacement migration (UNDP 2001) investigates how
much immigration would be necessary to offset population aging in various
low-fertility countries. Apparently, the supply of potential migrants is not
a limiting factor for international labor flows, see, e.g., Facchini and Mayda
(2008) who make restrictive immigration policies responsible for low observed
international labor flows.
This paper sets up a political economy model of a representative demo-
cracy to answer the question whether the demand for immigrants is higher in
countries with an older population. It accounts for the fact that immigrants
in industrialized countries tend to have more children than natives, altering
the political balance in subsequent periods. Furthermore, the paper distin-
guishes between different possible pension system characteristics. While the
benchmark model abstracts from public pensions, the model extensions in
section 4 contrast a pension system with fixed benefits to one with fully
flexible benefits and contributions.
Point of departure is a two-period economy with two overlapping gener-
ations, young workers and old retirees. In each period the respective govern-
ment sets the immigration level to maximize political support from its voters,
i.e. from both currently living generations. The electorate is heterogeneous
since workers and retirees have conflicting preferences concerning the number
of immigrants. Due to its effects on factor accumulation, immigration policy
in the first period not only influences the welfare of current generations but
it also has consequences for welfare in the second period. Immigration policy
is, therefore, a sequential game between the governments of the subsequent
periods. The equilibrium of this game is derived to analyze how the popu-
lation growth rate influences the level of immigration. The bottom line of
the analysis is that in a representative democracy an increase in the share of
old individuals in the electorate enhances immigration. This result holds re-
gardless of whether old individuals have a pension income financed by young
individuals’ contributions or only an income from private savings.
In the present model, preferences concerning immigration are driven both
by the impact of immigration on factor prices and on the pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) pension system, and by non-economic factors subsumed in a “disu-
tility” parameter. The income effects induced by immigration in the host
country have been analyzed under a variety of assumptions, see, e.g., Razin
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and Sadka (2000, 2004), Epstein and Hillman (2003), and Kemnitz (2003).
In theory, immigration alters factor prices by increasing labor supply (wages
decline while returns to capital increase). If the labor market is not fully
flexible, unemployment may increase instead, as in Kemnitz (2003). These
effects are dampened if capital is mobile internationally, or if production
structures adjust as predicted by the Rybczynski theorem, see, e.g., Hillman
and Weiss (1999). Despite capital mobility and trade migration seems to have
an impact on incomes: whereas Card (1990) finds that the Mariel boatlift
of 1980, a worker inflow of 7% of the Miami labor force, had virtually no
effect on wages and unemployment there, there is evidence for negative wage
effects at the national level, see, e.g., Borjas (2003). Furthermore, Angrist
and Kugler (2003), using European panel data from 1983 to 1999, find that
in Europe, immigration displaced natives, and that unemployment effects
were more negative in countries with less flexible labor markets. Meanwhile,
non-economic factors clearly shape attitudes toward immigration as well, see,
for instance, O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006) and Mayda (2006).
The present paper builds on several related publications with endogenous
immigration policy. Benhabib (1996) examines immigration policy in a me-
dian voter model with heterogeneous wealth endowments, whereas Mazza
and van Winden (1996) analyze the determination of redistribution and im-
migration policies in a representative democracy with workers and capital
owners. In both models, individuals are in favor of admitting immigrants
if these are different from themselves. In the dynamic models by Dolmas
and Huffman (2004) and Ortega (2005, 2010) preferences are mitigated or
even reversed as immigrants get to vote on redistribution policy in the fu-
ture. Natives may then favor the admission of immigrants who are similar
to themselves. This effect is counteracted in the present model by the high
number of immigrants’ offspring, who will oppose high pension benefits in
the future.
Scholten and Thum (1996) and Haupt and Peters (1998) analyze im-
migration policy in the presence of (exogenous) PAYG pensions in median
voter models with three generations. Immigration policy is determined by
old workers’ preferences in their settings. More closely related to this analysis
is a relatively recent paper by Sand and Razin (2007). They analyze equi-
librium immigration and pension policy making in a dynamic set-up with
two overlapping generations. In their median-voter framework, population
aging may lead to a switch from the young voters’ preferred policies to an
implementation of the old voters’ preferred policies, namely maximum im-
migration and a tax rate which maximizes social security revenue. Following
Hillman and Weiss (1999), the present approach chooses a political support
function that includes all groups of voters to model a representative demo-
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cracy, rather than a median voter model. In contrast to Sand and Razin
(2007), the predicted consequences of aging are less drastic. Instead, the re-
lationship between population growth and the equilibrium immigration level
is continuous.1
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The economic model
is set up in section 2 and immigration policy is analyzed in section 3. Section
4 adds a social security system to the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Economic Model
The economic framework is a two-period version of an overlapping genera-
tions model with workers and retirees. A two-period model is sufficient to
show the key effects of immigration on both generations’ utility levels while
it is relatively straightforward to solve: individuals know that the world ends
after two periods and there is a closed-form solution for the equilibrium in
the second period, which can be used to derive the equilibrium in the first
period.
In each period t = 1, 2 competitive firms produce a single aggregate good
with a Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yt = K
α
t L
1−α
t .
Young individuals supply one unit of labor. The workforce Lt is composed
of natives and immigrants such that Lt = Nt(1 + γt), where γt is the ratio
of immigrants per native worker (as in Sand and Razin 2007). The capital
stock Kt is given by the old individuals’ savings. For simplicity capital is
assumed to depreciate completely after one period. The capital stock per
worker (native or immigrant) is defined as kt ≡ Kt/Lt and the capital stock
per native worker as k˜t ≡ Kt/Nt, therefore kt = k˜t/(1 + γt). International
trade or capital mobility which may theoretically result in world factor price
equalization are ignored. For a given capital stock per native worker, immi-
gration thus lowers the capital intensity in production and thereby wages,
whereas capital returns increase. Equilibrium factor prices are then given by
wt = (1− α)k˜αt (1 + γt)−α and 1 + rt = αk˜α−1t (1 + γt)1−α . (1)
In each period, young individuals receive a wage income wt. The young
generation born in the first period allocates the wage income to consumption
and savings. The young generation born in the second period only lives for
1Note that in an overlapping-generations model with many generations, aging would
not lead to drastic changes in the median voter’s preferred policy either.
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that period and therefore consumes its entire wage income. Old individuals
are retired and consume all of their wealth st−1 (1 + rt). In the benchmark
setting there is no social security system. Utility is logarithmic in consump-
tion:
Uy1 = ln c
y
1 + β ln c
o
2 − dγ1 − βdγ2 , Uy2 = ln cy2 − dγ2 , and
U ot = ln c
o
t − dγt , t = 1, 2 .
The term dγt denotes a disutility related to immigration or to the integration
of immigrants, which is not accounted for in incomes and does not affect in-
dividuals’ consumption decision. For instance, an increased heterogeneity of
social norms and customs may reduce utility as in Hillman (2002) and Krieger
(2005). Additionally, the parameter d may capture a reduction in the util-
ity derived from public goods which results from heterogeneous preferences
(see Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). The young in period 1 also anticipate
the disutility dγ2 related to immigration in period 2. Optimal savings and
consumption of the first-period young are
s1 =
β
1 + β
w1 , c
y
1 =
1
1 + β
w1 , and c
o
2 =
β
1 + β
w1 (1 + r2) . (2)
Immigration is permanent and the children of immigrants are considered
as natives, such that N2 = (1 + n)N1 + (1 + m)γ1N1, where n is the native
rate of population growth and m the immigrant rate of population growth.
Defining the difference between the population growth rates of immigrants
and natives as δ = m − n, the number of workers in period 2 is N2 =
[(1 + n)(1 + γ1) + δγ1]N1. In line with empirical evidence on immigration to
industrialized countries, only the case δ ≥ 0 is considered. Immigrants are
fully integrated into the economy after one period and are allowed to vote in
their old age.
The capital market is in equilibrium if K2 = s1L1. The capital endowment
of each native worker in the second period is given by
k˜2 =
β(1− α)k˜α1 (1 + γ1)1−α
(1 + β) [(1 + n)(1 + γ1) + δγ1]
, (3)
since k˜2 = s1 (1 + γ1)N1/N2. According to (3), immigration lowers capital
accumulation per native worker:
dk˜2
dγ1
= − k˜2
1 + γ1
[
δ
(1 + n)(1 + γ1) + δγ1
+ α
]
< 0 . (4)
The reason for this result is that both wage income and thereby individual
savings, and the ratio of savers to next period’s native workers decline with
immigration.
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3 Immigration Policy in the Benchmark Model
The political economy equilibrium is derived under the assumption of a rep-
resentative democracy in which the government accounts for the welfare of
both contemporaneously living generations when setting immigration policy.
More precisely, in each period t = 1, 2 the government sets γt to maximize
the following objective function:
Wt = ω
o
tV
o
t + ω
y
t V
y
t ,
where V ot and V
y
t denote the indirect utility of a representative old and
young individual, respectively, while ωot and ω
y
t denote their political weights.
This objective function is more suitable for replicating policy outcomes in a
representative democracy than the median voter’s utility, as Hillman and
Weiss (1999) argue. It can be motivated by a probabilistic voting framework
as in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Coughlin et al. (1990). It is assumed
that both generations are equally responsive to policy changes, such that the
government weights each generation’s utility with its share in the electorate:2
ωot =
1 + γt−1
(2 + n)(1 + γt−1) + δγt−1
and ωyt = 1− ωot .
The sequence of events is as follows: At the beginning of each period, the
respective government decides on immigration policy. Production takes place
after immigration and finally, young individuals decide how to allocate their
wage income to consumption and savings. It is straightforward to solve the
model by backward induction. Therefore, equilibrium immigration policy in
the second period is discussed first. The second-period immigration rate is
then used to derive the first-period equilibrium. While a closed-form solution
for γ2 exists, this is not the case for γ1. However, it is possible to identify the
different channels through which first-period immigration affects the young
and old generations and to solve numerically for the equilibrium.
Immigration Policy in the Second Period
In the second period, the young prefer not to admit any immigrants because
of the induced decline in the wage and because of the disutility related to
immigration, dγ2. The old would like to admit immigrants up to the point
where the marginal increase in the capital return is equal to the marginal
2Relaxing this assumption would allow for the influence of interest groups as in Facchini
and Mayda (2008).
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non-income disutility d. Marginal utilities are
dV o2
dγ2
=
1− α
1 + γ2
− d and dV
y
2
dγ2
= − α
1 + γ2
− d (5)
for the old and young respectively. From the government’s first-order condi-
tion
ωo2
1− α
1 + γ2
− ωy2
α
1 + γ2
− d = 0 ,
follows the policy rule
1 + γ2 =
ωo2 − α
d
. (6)
Equilibrium immigration is contingent on past immigration but not on
the state variable k˜2. The policy rule in (6) has a number of properties which
are worth discussing because they also apply to the first period: A positive
number of immigrants is admitted (γ2 > 0) as long as d < ω
o
2−α, i.e., the non-
income disutility of integrating immigrants has to be sufficiently small. Since
only the old generation favors admitting a positive number of immigrants,
the second-period immigration rate rises with the old’s population share (and
declines with their share in aggregate income). The population share is
contingent on the native population growth rate, on the previous period’s
immigration rate and on the difference in population growth rates between
natives and immigrants.
A high native population growth rate n implies that the political weight
of the old generation is low. Population aging – a decline in the population
growth rate n – therefore leads to a rise in immigration (for a given first-
period immigration rate):
∂γ2
∂n
= −(ω
o
2)
2
d
< 0 .
The immigration rate in the first period alters the age composition of the
electorate in the second period as long as immigrants have more children than
natives. The second-period population share of the old generation declines as
more immigrants are admitted in the first period. Consequently, γ2 declines
in γ1:
dγ2
dγ1
= −1
d
· δ(ω
o
2)
2
(1 + γ1)2
≤ 0 iff δ ≥ 0 . (7)
The second-period immigration rate is also a declining function of δ (for given
γ1 > 0) since a higher number of offspring among the immigrants from the
previous period increases the share of young individuals:
∂γ2
∂δ
= − γ1
1 + γ1
(ωo2)
2
d
≤ 0 iff γ1 ≥ 0 .
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In summary, the government’s preferred immigration rate in the second
period clearly increases as the young generation’s share in the electorate de-
clines. However, the immigration rates in both periods are substitutes. A
high first-period immigration rate thus counteracts the effect of population
aging on the second-period immigration rate. The effects of first-period im-
migration on both generations and the first-period government’s preferred
immigration rate will be discussed now.
Immigration Policy in the First Period
The first-period government accounts for the impact of its immigration pol-
icy decision on factor accumulation and on the immigration rate set by the
second-period government. In the first period, the old generation’s marginal
utility from immigration is the same as in the second period, dV o1 /dγ1 =
(1 − α)/(1 + γ1) − d. However, the young generation’s marginal utility is
contingent on factor accumulation and on future policy:
dV y1
dγ1
=
1
cy1
1
1 + β
dw1
dγ1
+ β
1
co2
β
1 + β
[
dw1
dγ1
(1 + r2) + w1
dr2
dγ1
]
− d− βddγ2
dγ1
. (8)
Whereas the declining wage lowers consumption in young and old age,
immigration also has some second-order effects on the future capital return
(via its impact on capital accumulation and on the future age composition
of the electorate). Furthermore, since the immigration rates in both periods
are substitutes, admitting more immigrants in the first period lowers the
disutility related to immigration in the second period, which can be seen
from the last term in (8). The impact of immigration on the wage rate is
dw1
dγ1
= − α
1 + γ1
w1 , (9)
while the impact on the future capital return is given by
dr2
dγ1
= −1− α
k˜2
(1 + r2)
dk˜2
dγ1
+
1− α
1 + γ2
(1 + r2)
dγ2
dγ1
, (10)
with dγ2/dγ1 < 0 given by (7) and dk˜2/dγ1 < 0 given by (4).
The government’s first-order condition in the first period can be written
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as
ωo1 ·
1− α
1 + γ1
− ωy1 ·
α(1 + β)
1 + γ1
+ ωy1β ·
1− α
1 + γ1
[
δ
(1 + n)(1 + γ1) + δγ1
+ α− δ(ω
o
2)
2
(1 + γ1)(ωo2 − α)
]
− d+ ωy1β
δ(ωo2)
2
(1 + γ1)2
= 0 ,
(11)
where the population shares reduce to ωo1 = 1/(2+n) and ω
y
1 = (1+n)/(2+n),
since there is no past immigration. This equation is highly non-linear in the
immigration rate γ1 and therefore cannot be expressed analytically in closed
form. Note, however, that γ1 does not depend on the state variable k˜1 either,
but only on the model parameters. The impact of the parameters determining
the demographic structure of the population is of primary interest, i.e. the
impact of the native population growth rate n and of the difference between
the immigrant and the native population growth rate δ.
Whereas in the second period a lower population growth rate n enhances
immigration by increasing the old generation’s share in the electorate, it has
some additional (contrasting) effects on the equilibrium immigration rate in
the first period. Firstly, as argued in section 2, immigration reduces the
future ratio of capital to native workers, implying a higher future capital
return, because of lower wages and because of a lower number of savers rela-
tive to the number of next-period natives. Both of these effects are enhanced
by a low population growth rate, weakening the opposition of the young
generation to immigration. Secondly, the dampening effect of first-period
immigration on second-period immigration is larger the lower is the native
population’s growth rate. This has two opposing effects on preferences over
the level of first-period immigration. A lower γ2 due to a higher γ1 directly
increases the young generation’s lifetime utility, also weakening the young’s
opposition to immigration as n declines. However, the second-period capital
return is reduced, enhancing opposition to immigration. In summary, a lower
population growth rate induces several expanding effects on immigration pol-
icy, but also a contracting effect, since the increase in the future return on
savings is dampened.
Contrary to the second period, the difference in population growth rates
between immigrants and natives δ does not influence the political weights of
the two generations in the first period, since there is no past immigration.3
However, δ alters the impact of the first-period immigration rate on the
second-period immigration rate γ2 and on second-period capital per native
3This simplification would not apply in a setting with a longer time-horizon.
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k˜2. It can be shown that δ has contrasting effects on both derivatives. On the
one hand, first-period immigration has a stronger negative impact on second-
period immigration the larger the reduction in the old generation’s future
political weight ωo2. As mentioned above, this weight declines as immigrants
have more children than natives. On the other hand, there is also a level
effect: the impact of γ1 on γ2 is weaker the smaller ω
o
2. Similarly, γ1 has a
stronger negative impact on k˜2 the larger δ. This is because the ratio of savers
to next-period natives declines with the difference in population growth rates
between immigrants and natives. However, there is also a level effect: the
impact of γ1 on k˜2 is weaker the smaller is k˜2, which is the case for a large
difference in population growth rates. Intuitively, the government admits
many immigrants if there is a strong negative impact of immigration on
capital accumulation, since this implies higher capital returns in the second
period.
If immigrants have the same number of children as natives, immigra-
tion policy does not have any impact on the future age composition of the
electorate and the nonlinear terms vanish. For this special case (δ = 0),
immigration policy is determined by the time-invariant rule
1 + γ1 =
(1− α)− (1 + n)α(1 + αβ)
(2 + n)d
.
The derivative of the immigration rate with respect to the population growth
rate can then analytically be shown to be negative. For δ > 0, however,
numerical simulations are necessary to find a solution for γ1 and to investigate
the impact of n and δ.
Before discussing the simulation results the choice of parameter values is
now motivated. This investigation largely follows Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2003)
in defining the different parameter values. Population parameters are taken
from the United Nations’ Population Division Database (UNPD 2006). The
production share of capital α is set to 0.35. According to Bo¨rsch-Supan et al.
(2003) a common assumption for the annual discount rate of households is
0.01. If it is assumed that each of the two life periods lasts for 30 years,4
this corresponds to a discount factor β of about 0.75. The benchmark native
population growth rate is n = −0.2, which is computed from the 2000-2005
average number of children per woman for the world’s more developed re-
gions. The difference between the immigrant and native population growth
rates δ is set to 0.5, the difference between the less developed regions (ex-
cluding the least developed regions) and the more developed regions. The
non-economic disutility parameter related to the integration of immigrants,
4An increase in life expectancy is not modeled.
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d, is set to 0.1. This is, of course, somewhat arbitrary. However, this pa-
rameter has a direct and unambiguous impact on equilibrium immigration.
Therefore, the effect of picking a different value for d is quite clear.
Figure III.1 illustrates the simulation results. Population aging visibly
increases the government’s preferred immigration rate γ1. Bear in mind that
this attenuates the positive effect of population aging on second-period im-
migration since the immigration rates in both periods are substitutes. The
aggregate effect of the population growth rate on the second-period immi-
gration rate is given by
dγ2
dn
=
∂γ2
∂n
+
dγ2
dγ1
· ∂γ1
∂n
.
With ∂γ1/∂n < 0, the positive effect of population aging on the second-period
immigration rate is at least attenuated by a higher first-period immigration
rate. The simulations reveal that the aggregate effect of aging on the immi-
gration rate in the second period is positive for very low population growth
rates but negative for population growth rates close to zero. Meanwhile, the
overall effect of the difference between the native and the immigrant popula-
tion growth rate is ambiguous. Figure 1(b) shows more clearly that δ has a
non-monotonic effect on γ1. An increase in the difference between population
growth rates lowers immigration, given that this difference is already high.
However, the opposite is true for a low difference δ. The conclusions which
can be drawn from the simulations are outlined in proposition 1.
Proposition 1 In a representative democracy without a social security sys-
tem,
(i) a lower native population growth rate has a direct positive effect on the
equilibrium immigration rate. However, the immigration rates in the two pe-
riods are substitutes.
(ii) the difference between the native and the immigrant population growth
rate has a non-monotonic effect on the equilibrium immigration rate. The
immigration rate increases for low differences in population growth rates but
decreases for high differences.
Summarizing, immigration influences voters’ welfare in two ways, by al-
tering factor prices and by causing a non-income disutility. Population aging
leads to a higher level of immigration in the first period since immigration in-
creases the return on the old generation’s accumulated capital. If immigrants
have more children than natives, first-period immigration raises the share of
young voters in the second period. Consequently, the immigration rates in
both periods are substitutes. The following section turns to the question of
whether the existence of a social security system changes these results.
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(a) Impact of n and δ
(b) Impact of δ for given n
Figure III.1: Impact of n and δ on First-Period Immigration
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4 Social Security
Since aging implies a higher old-age dependency ratio, immigration is often
seen as a (partial) solution to financing problems of social security, in par-
ticular of PAYG pension systems. Therefore, a pension system is introduced
into the model to investigate the relationship between immigration and social
security. Net wages are wt(1 − τt), where τt is the contribution rate to the
pension system. A balanced budget is assumed such that
τt =
bt
wt(1 + lt)
,
with bt as the level of individual pension benefits.
Optimal savings and consumption of the first-period young are then given
by
s1 =
β
1 + β
w1(1− τ1)− 1
1 + β
b2
1 + r2
,
cy1 =
1
1 + β
w1(1− τ1) + 1
1 + β
b2
1 + r2
, and
co2 =
β
1 + β
w1(1− τ1)(1 + r2) + β
1 + β
b2 .
(12)
Note that the impact of immigration on capital accumulation, determined
by k˜2 = s1 (1 + γ1)N1/N2, is ambiguous. Although the ratio of workers to
next period’s native workers (1 + γ1)N1/N2 declines with immigration, the
net wage may not. Furthermore, per capita savings increase with a declining
discounted value of future pension benefits.
Equilibrium immigration policy with PAYG pensions is analyzed in two
different settings. In the first setting, pensioners receive a flat benefit bt =
b, whereas in the second setting, the government can freely set the social
security contribution rate τt in each period.
5 In the first setting, pension
contributions are endogenously determined by the government’s choice of
the immigration rate.
Flat Benefit
In the case of a flat benefit, the government sets immigration policy γt to
maximize (3), taking into account that individuals allocate consumption ac-
cording to (12). Individuals’ marginal utility in the second period is not the
5The same results would hold if the government was assumed to set bt instead of τt.
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same as in a model without a social security system, see (5). Instead, it is
given by
dV o2
dγ2
=
1− α
1 + γ2
· s1(1 + r2)
co2
−d and dV
y
2
dγ2
= − 1
1 + γ2
·w2(α− τ2)
cy2
−d , (13)
for the old and young generation respectively, where
co2 = s1(1 + r2) + b and c
y
2 = w2(1− τ2) .
In this setting, immigration has no effect on the old generation’s social
security benefits. The old’s utility gain due to increasing capital returns is
smaller the smaller the share of private savings in the old’s total consumption
– the larger social security benefits. Although the young experience a utility
loss due to declining wages, they benefit from a declining social security
contribution rate. For τ2 > α, the young’s marginal economic utility from
raising immigration is actually positive. Even if τ2 ≤ α, the old’s and young’s
preferences in the presence of PAYG pensions are closer together than in the
benchmark model.
From the first-order condition
ωo2
1− α
1 + γ2
s1(1 + r2)
co2
− ωy2
1
1 + γ2
w2(α− τ2)
cy2
− d = 0 ,
the government’s preferred immigration rate can be computed numerically.
Again, population aging increases the share of individuals who clearly favor
immigration. Additionally, aging now boosts the positive effect of immigra-
tion on the young’s utility because a lower native population growth rate
implies higher pension contributions. Note that the equilibrium immigration
rate is now contingent on the old’s and young’s consumptions levels, and
therefore on the state variable k˜2. An increase in k˜2 weakens the effect of
immigration on the old generation’s utility and enhances its effect on the
young generation’s utility. Equilibrium immigration thus decreases, unless
τ2 > α.
The results for the second period are not discussed separately, but the
first-order condition of the second-period government is used for the sim-
ulations of the full model with social security. In the first period, immi-
gration affects the old in the same way as in the second period: dV o1 /dγ1 =
(1−α)/(1+γ1)·s0(1+r1)/co1−d. The old’s benefit from increasing capital re-
turns is smaller the smaller the share of private savings in their consumption.
Meanwhile, the young’s welfare is also affected by the impact of first-period
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on second-period immigration and by the change in future capital returns:
dV y1
dγ1
=
1
cy1
1
1 + β
[
dw1(1− τ1)
dγ1
− b
(1 + r2)2
dr2
dγ1
]
+
β
co2
β
1 + β
[
dw1(1− τ1)
dγ1
(1 + r2) + w1(1− τ1)dr2
dγ1
]
− d− βddγ2
dγ1
,
(14)
where cy1 and c
o
2 are given by (12).
The impact of immigration on the young’s net wage,
dw1(1− τ1)
dγ1
= −w1 (α− τ1)
1 + γ1
,
may be positive or negative, as in the second period. Furthermore, immi-
gration in the first period affects second-period capital returns via capital
accumulation and via the second-period immigration rate, as in (10).
Raising immigration raises the future share of young voters, which sug-
gests a negative derivative dγ2/dγ1, confirmed by the simulations. The im-
pact of immigration on capital accumulation is contingent on r2 and therefore
also on the derivative dγ2/dγ1:
dk˜2
dγ1
=
− δ
(1+γ1)2
k˜2 − β1+β w1(α−τ1)1+γ1 + 11+β 1−α1+γ2 b1+r2
dγ2
dγ1
ωy2
ωo2
+ 1
1+β
1−α
k˜2
b
1+r2
. (15)
Although the net wage may increase with immigration, the decreasing ratio
of savers to second-period natives and the increasing value of discounted
second-period benefits cause a dampening effect of γ1 on k˜2, also confirmed
by the simulations.
Figure III.2 illustrates that, in the first period as well, both generations’
conflict of interest concerning immigration is less pronounced than in the ab-
sence of a pension system. Given a native population growth rate of n = −0.2
and a difference between the immigrant and the native population growth
rate of δ = 0.5, figures 2(a) and 2(b) show both generations’ utility levels
as functions of first-period immigration, for different degrees of generosity
of the pension system.6 One can see from the figures that the old’s utility
gain from increasing capital returns is smaller the larger pension benefits,
6Only benefit levels below the level of the wage income (in the absence of immigration),
w1|γ1=0 = 0.37 are considered. The capital stock per native worker and immigration in
the second period are computed endogenously.
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(a) Impact of γ1 on V
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1
(b) Impact of γ1 on V
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1
Figure III.2: Impact of Immigration on Welfare
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whereas the young’s utility loss from a decreasing gross wage is mitigated or
even reversed by decreasing pension contributions. For sizable levels of so-
cial security benefits, the young thus also prefer positive levels of immigration
over no immigration.
To derive the level of immigration in the first period, the following La-
grangian is set up:
L = ωo1V o1 + ωy1V y1 + λ
dW2
dγ2
+ µ
(
k˜2 − ω
o
2
ωy2
s1
)
.
The government in the first period thus maximizes aggregate welfare in the
first period subject to the first-order condition in the second period and
subject to the capital accumulation condition. To find the equilibrium of the
2-period model, one has to solve the system
dL
dγ1
= 0,
dL
dk˜2
= 0,
dL
dγ2
= 0, k˜2 − ω
o
2
ωy2
s1 = 0 and
dW2
dγ2
= 0 .
It is relatively straightforward to compute these derivatives numerically.
Figure III.3 shows the simulated equilibrium values for first-period im-
migration γ1 as a function of the level of individual pension benefits b. The
solid line in figures 3(a) and 3(b) is based on the benchmark parameter val-
ues n = −0.2 and δ = 0.5. The figures illustrate that an initially positive
preferred immigration rate is reduced by the introduction of pensions. This
is due to the old generation’s decreased utility gain, as private savings ac-
count for a smaller share of their income. While immigration still entails a
non-income disutility, its effectivity as a device for income redistribution is
reduced. However, the government’s preferred immigration rate increases as
pensions increase further, because the young generation benefits from shar-
ing the burden of pension contributions with the immigrants. Whereas figure
3(a) shows the relationship between b and γ1 for various levels of the native
population growth rate, figure 3(b) shows a smaller detail of this relation-
ship for various levels of the difference in population growth rates. As in
the case without a social security system, population aging clearly enhances
immigration, whereas the impact of differences in the number of children is
ambiguous.
The conclusion is:
Proposition 2 Given a PAYG pension system with exogenous benefits b
(i) the level of pension benefits has a non-monotonic effect on equilibrium im-
migration. The government’s preferred immigration rate decreases for small
levels of b, but increases above the immigration rate in the absence of PAYG
44
(a) Different levels of n
(b) Different levels of δ
Figure III.3: Impact of Social Security on First-Period Immigration
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pensions for high levels of b.
(ii) a lower native population growth rate has a positive effect on the equilib-
rium immigration rate.
(iii) the difference between the native and the immigrant population growth
rate has an ambiguous effect on the immigration rate.
Notice that in this setting the old’s pension benefits are not contingent
on the level of the young’s wages. This is different if the government can
freely set both the current immigration rate γt and the current social security
contribution rate τt. That setting is discussed next.
Fully Flexible Contributions and Benefits
The government now maximizes its objective function (3) with respect to γt
and to τt. Even though substantial pension reforms in the last decade have
met with a lot of opposition, it seems plausible to assume that industrial-
ized countries’ governments are able to change the parameters of the social
security system over time. In many industrialized countries, the level of pen-
sion benefits is at least partly tied to wages. Actual PAYG pension systems
should therefore be located between the two extreme settings discussed here.
Second period consumption levels are co2 = s1(1+r2)+b2 and c
y
2 = w2(1−
τ2), where b2 = τ2w2(1 + l2) and τ2 is set by the government. Immigration
negatively affects the young generation since the gross wage declines. It has
several effects on the old generation’s welfare: on the one hand immigration
raises the capital return and also the number of contributors to social security.
On the other hand, the declining gross wage reduces social security benefits,
ceteris paribus. The net effect of higher immigration on the old generation’s
welfare is positive. Marginal utilities reduce to (5):
dV o2
dγ2
=
1− α
1 + γ2
− d and dV
y
2
dγ2
= − α
1 + γ2
− d ,
just as in the case without social security. Although the income change from
immigration is proportional to consumption and thus higher for the old and
lower for the young with a social security system in place, the marginal utility
of income is accordingly lower for the old and higher for the young. The
additional effects of immigration induced by the existence of a social security
system exactly cancel out and consequently, the chosen level of immigration
in the second period is given by (6).
Regarding social security contributions, the old and young generations’
preferences are unambiguous. Whereas the old favor high benefits, the young
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would prefer not to pay any social security contributions. From the govern-
ment’s first-order condition follows the equilibrium social security contribu-
tion rate7
τ2 =
ωo2 − α
1− α . (16)
Equilibrium social security contributions increase in the population share of
the old generation. Although the social security contribution rate in the sec-
ond period is independent from second-period immigration, it is contingent
on first-period immigration since first-period immigration reduces the share
of old voters in the second period.
In the first period, the old generation’s marginal utility corresponds to
the one in the second period and thus does not differ from the case without
a pension system. However, the young generation’s marginal utility does not
reduce to equation (8). Instead, it is given by
dV y1
dγ1
=
1
cy1
1
1 + β
[
dw1
dγ1
(1− τ1) + d (b2/ (1 + r2))
dγ1
]
+ β
1
co2
β
1 + β
[
dw1
dγ1
(1− τ1) (1 + r2) + w1 (1− τ1) dr2
dγ1
+
db2
dγ1
]
− d− βddγ2
dγ1
.
(17)
with dw1/dγ1 and dr2/dγ1 still given by equations (9) and (10), where dγ2/dγ1
< 0, still given by (7). The key difference is that immigration in the first
period now has an impact on future social security policy, with
dτ2
dγ1
= − 1
1− α
δ (ωo2)
2
(1 + γ1)
2 < 0 .
Lower future pension contributions ceteris paribus imply lower benefits and
a negative effect on the young generation’s utility. This suggests that the
government’s chosen immigration rate will be lower than in the absence of a
pension system. Furthermore, lower future benefits enhance capital accumu-
lation since individuals have to provide for their old age consumption.
The impact of immigration on capital accumulation is now determined
by
dk˜2
dγ1
=− δ
(1 + γ1)
2
ωo2
ωy2
k˜2
− ω
o
2
ωy2
[
α
1 + γ1
β
1 + β
w1 (1− τ1) + 1
1 + β
d (b2/(1 + r2))
dγ1
]
.
(18)
7See Lorz (1999) and more recently Gonzales-Eiras and Niepelt (2007) who derive
similar results in models without immigration.
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Discounted future benefits b2/(1 + r2) can be written in terms of τ2 and w1:
b2
1 + r2
=
1−α
α
β
1+β
τ2
1 + 1−α
α
1
1+β
τ2
· w1 (1− τ1) .
Since immigration reduces both w1 and τ2 it has a negative impact on dis-
counted future benefits:
d (b2/(1 + r2))
dγ1
= − b2
1 + r2
 α
1 + γ1
+
δ (ωo2)
2
(1 + γ1)
2 ·
1
(ωo2 − α)
(
1 +
ωo2−α
α
1
1+β
)
 < 0 ,
(19)
and therefore a positive (partial) effect on capital accumulation. The simula-
tions show that the aggregate effect on capital accumulation is still negative.
Meanwhile, the effect on undiscounted benefits is ambiguous: even though
the contribution rate and the number of future immigrant contributors de-
cline, the future ratio of native contributors to pension recipients increases.
Furthermore, the impact of immigration on the future wage rate is ambigu-
ous. The derivative can be written as
db2
dγ1
= b2
ωo2
ωy2
δ
(1 + γ1)2
+ b2
(
α
k˜2
· dk˜2
dγ1
− 2− α
1 + γ2
· 1
d
δ(ωo2)
2
(1 + γ1)2
)
, (20)
with dk˜2/dγ1 defined by equations (18) and (19). The first term in (20) is
the effect on the future ratio of native contributors to pension recipients,
whereas the last term is the effect on the future share of old voters, which
determines both γ2 and τ2.
The simulations of the model confirm that the equilibrium immigration
rate in the presence of fully flexible pension contributions and benefits is
lower than in the absence of a pension system, see figure III.4. Figure 4(a)
shows the relationship between the first-period immigration rate and the
native population growth rate in the presence and in the absence of social
security, given δ = 0.5. Figure 4(b) shows the relationship between the first-
period immigration rate and the difference in population growth rates given
n = −0.2.
Since the old generation unambiguously benefits from immigration, pop-
ulation aging still boosts immigration, as figure 4(a) shows. The difference
between the native and the immigrant population growth rate still has a
non-monotonic effect, see figure 4(b). Note that if immigrants have the same
number of children as natives (δ = 0), the existence of a PAYG pension
system does not affect immigration. This result is due to the fact that first-
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(a) Impact of n
(b) Impact of δ
Figure III.4: First-Period Immigration With and Without a Pension System
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period immigration then does not have any impact on the second-period pen-
sion contribution rate τ2. The findings of the model with a pension system
with fully flexible parameters are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Given a PAYG pension system with fully flexible benefits and
contributions
(i) the equilibrium immigration rate is lower than in the absence of a pension
system.
(ii) a lower native population growth rate has a positive effect on the equilib-
rium immigration rate.
(iii) the difference between the native and the immigrant population growth
rate has a non-monotonic effect on the equilibrium immigration rate.
Recall that in the presence of exogenous old-age pensions financed by the
young generation the equilibrium immigration rate may well be higher than
in the absence of a pension system. However, the immigration rate is lower if
the government can freely decide on both the volume of immigration and the
generosity of the pension system. If the pension benefit is exogenous, young
individuals benefit from sharing the burden of pension contributions with
immigrants. This effect is absent when the burden of pension contributions
is endogenous. However, then, immigration generates a negative externality
for the young generation as long as immigrants have more children than na-
tives: the larger future cohort of young individuals will induce lower pension
contributions and ceteris paribus lower benefits.
5 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the effects of population aging on immigration policy
in a two-period economy with two overlapping generations. A representative
democracy was modeled by assuming that in each period the respective gov-
ernment limits immigration to the level that maximizes aggregate welfare of
its voters. Immigration preferences are driven by economic as well as non-
economic motives: immigration alters factor prices and additionally causes
a disutility not related to individual incomes. Population aging implies that
the old generation receives a higher political weight in the government’s ob-
jective function. Aging has an expansionary effect on the chosen immigration
level, due to the fact that immigration increases the return on the old gen-
eration’s savings. However, as immigrants have more children than natives,
a high immigration rate in the first period is tantamount to a large share of
young voters, and therefore low immigration, in the second period.
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In the presence of a PAYG pension system, immigration additionally af-
fects the level of pension contributions and/or benefits. Population aging still
unambiguously enhances immigration but the predictions concerning the ef-
fect of pensions on immigration policy are contingent on how the pension
system is modeled. The paper contrasts a system with fixed benefits to one
with fully flexible contributions and benefits. With exogenous pension bene-
fits the young and old generations’ preferences are closer together than in the
absence of a pension system: whereas the old’s utility gain from immigration
decreases with a decreasing share of private savings in their consumption,
the young’s net wage may even increase with immigration since individual
pension contributions decline. For high benefit levels, equilibrium immigra-
tion is higher than in the absence of a pension system, whereas the reverse
is true for low benefit levels. Contrary to this, the chosen immigration rate
is lower than in the absence of pensions when the government can freely set
contributions: the government anticipates that immigration will reduce its
young voters’ future pensions benefits. As immigrants have more children
than natives, the future old’s population share declines with immigration.
In the benchmark model presented in this paper, positive levels of im-
migration are driven solely by old individuals’ preferences for high capital
returns. If pension benefits are fixed, native young workers also benefit from
sharing the burden of pension contributions with immigrant workers. Fur-
ther insights can be expected from introducing different skill levels into the
model. Skilled native workers may support the immigration of low skilled
workers and vice versa. Furthermore, as the World Bank (2008) outlines,
the agglomeration of skilled labor may entail benefits because of increasing
returns to scale and external effects such as welfare spillovers as in Facchini
and Mayda (2008).
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Part IV
Why Don’t Labor and Capital
Flow Between Young and Old
Countries?
Lena Calahorrano and Philipp an de Meulena
Abstract
We investigate the effect of demographics on international factor flows
in a political-economy framework. Demographic differences between
industrialized and developing countries add to factor price differences
which imply economic incentives for migration to developed countries
and for capital flows to developing countries. However, political bar-
riers to immigration in developed countries and expropriation risks
in developing countries impede factor flows. We explore how these
restrictions interact, using a political economy approach that takes
into account different generations’ conflicting attitudes toward immi-
gration and expropriation. We find that in the presence of mobility
constraints larger demographic differences between countries need not
result in an increase of factor flows.
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1 Introduction
Virtually all industrialized countries and many developing countries are fac-
ing a decline in birth rates and an increase in life expectancy. However, demo-
graphic structures differ widely between industrialized and developing coun-
tries: in general, birth rates are much smaller in rich industrialized countries
than in the developing world. Industrialized countries are thus characterized
by a larger proportion of old relative to young individuals. Since individuals
accumulate capital throughout their working life, developed countries dispose
of relatively large stocks of productive capital per worker. This adds to high
wages but low capital returns in comparison to developing countries. Conse-
quently, large efficiency gains from international capital and labor movements
seem possible.
The significance of demographic structures for international migration
and foreign direct investment (FDI) has aroused international interest. Fac-
tor movements are discussed not only as a means to realize efficiency gains
but also as a driver for economic growth in developing countries and to secure
pension systems in industrialized countries. While the United Nations’ report
on replacement migration calculates the size of labor movements necessary
to offset population aging in various low-fertility countries (see UNPD 2001),
INGENUE (2001) and Brooks (2003) simulate the effects of demographic
trends on international capital flows under the assumption that capital is
perfectly mobile while labor is not. Brooks (2003) predicts that the US and
the EU will be large capital exporters until their baby boomers retire around
2020.
However, political constraints to factor flows exist both in developing
and developed countries. Developing countries with a favorable demographic
structure to inward investment often do not offer the institutional framework
for international investors to fully reap efficiency gains. Governments of
industrialized countries in turn tend to be sensitive to native resentments
toward the admission of immigrants. Observed international factor flows are
indeed far too low to equalize the returns to capital and labor. Brooks (2003)
notes that capital flows would be considerably lower than predicted by his
model if institutional risk was taken into account. Concerning labor, Facchini
and Mayda (2008) make restrictive immigration policies responsible for the
low level of international flows.
To understand the determinants of factor flows we thus have to assess the
political economy of mobility constraints. The political processes from which
mobility constraints result are influenced by heterogeneous interests within
a country’s population. Since different attitudes of labor and capital owners
are (basically) in line with different attitudes of young and old individuals,
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mobility constraints are directly influenced by the demographic structures of
populations. Demographic diversity thus has a twofold impact, on economic
incentives for factor flows and on attitudes toward factor flows. While it
unambiguously creates economic incentives for factor flows, its impact on
the outcome of the political process requires detailed consideration.
Research on the impediments to international capital and labor flows is
well established, but the simultaneous consideration of migration and invest-
ment policies has so far been neglected. This is a gap in the literature which
we aim to fill with our paper. Accounting for both kinds of policies jointly
does not simply imply that both migration and FDI are limited. Instead,
the volume of factor flows is determined by the interplay of policies. In our
model FDI constitutes a substitute to immigration from the industrialized
country’s point of view: the larger the share of capital invested in the devel-
oping country, the less immigrants are admitted to the industrialized country.
Meanwhile, higher emigration from the developing country secures capital in-
vestments there. From the developing country’s point of view migration and
FDI are thus complements.
To capture the demographic effects on international factor flows, we con-
sider a one-period setting with sequential decisions in two open economies,
each populated by two generations. While the majority is young in the devel-
oping country, the reverse is true for the industrialized country. We assume
policies to be determined by the respective median voter’s preferences. The
government’s policy decision in the industrialized country is how many immi-
grants to admit, while in the developing country, imported capital can either
be expropriated or not.
Our model explains several stylized facts in a straightforward way. Firstly,
labor and capital flows are restricted by policies. Secondly, among poor
countries, more developed countries have a higher propensity to expropriate.
Thirdly, immigration preferences are driven by economic as well as non-
economic motives. Furthermore, the model shows that more demographic
diversity does not necessarily induce factor flows. Admitting immigrants is
more attractive for the industrialized country’s old median voter the younger
the developing country’s population. However, then, expropriation prefer-
ences of the young median voter are higher. The age structure in the in-
dustrialized country only affects expropriation preferences in the developing
country via emigration. Although immigration preferences in the industrial-
ized country may increase with the share of old, this need not be the case.
We set up the economic model in section 3. Section 4 analyzes equilibrium
policies, given simultaneity of the investment and migration policy decisions.
In section 5 we examine the impact of changes in parameters on the equilib-
rium, while section 6 extends our analysis to the case in which investment
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takes place after the migration policy decision. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our analysis draws on two strands of literature. The first one deals with
the impediments to capital flows from rich to poor countries. Contrary to
Lucas (1990), Alfaro et al. (2008) find that bad institutional quality does
play a major role in explaining the low level of capital investment in poor
countries. Several authors deal explicitly with expropriation risk of FDI.
Eaton and Gersovitz (1984), for example, argue that the mere existence of
expropriation risk distorts FDI flows even if expropriation does not occur.
Cole and English (1991) and Thomas and Worrall (1994) model dynamic
games between international investors and a host-country government under
the assumption that investors can punish the host country for expropriation
by withholding future investment. The authors find that in order to avoid
expropriation, FDI must not exceed a critical threshold.
Additionally, Harms (2002) shows in a theoretical model that a taxation of
foreign capital is more likely if the host country is poor. Other than taxation,
expropriation entails an additional cost, which grows with the technological
deficit of developing countries: Jodice (1980) finds a curvilinear effect of
development on expropriation risk, implying that the risk of expropriation
is largest in intermediately developed countries. He conjectures that while
very rich countries waive expropriation in favor of more subtle ways to seize
foreign investors’ revenues, very poor countries do not expropriate as they
hinge on the technological knowledge of foreign investors.
The second strand of literature we build on deals with endogenous im-
migration policy. In the static models by Benhabib (1996) and Mazza and
van Winden (1996), individuals support admitting immigrants if these are
different from themselves. Preferences may be reversed if immigrants receive
political rights. This is also an important prediction of the dynamic mod-
els of Dolmas and Huffman (2004) and Ortega (2005, 2010). In our model,
old capital owners’ immigration preferences are limited, even though immi-
grants do not have any political rights. This is because migration entails a
non-economic disutility and because it raises the capital intensity and thus
lowers returns on the share of capital invested in the developing country,
although it raises capital returns in the industrialized country.
As we do, Sand and Razin (2007) analyze the impact of aging on immi-
gration and also on redistribution policy. In their model the median voter’s
identity may change not only due to native population aging but also due to
the immigration of individuals who have more children than natives. This
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may restrain the old’s preference for admitting immigrants. We focus on the
effect of marginal changes in the population share of both generations. In
contrast to Sand and Razin, we therefore assume that the median voter in
the industrialized country is always old.
3 The Economic Model
We consider an industrialized country and a developing country, both popu-
lated by young and old individuals. The young individuals may potentially
supply their labor in either country, while the old individuals are out of the
labor force. The old individuals in the industrialized country own a given
amount of capital. Meanwhile, the old in the developing country do not own
any productive capital, only an endowment e∗ which they can consume, as
in Cole and English (1991). Assuming that the developing country’s old own
only a non-productive endowment is plausible since financial institutions are
rudimentary in many developing countries, and savings often take the form
of tangible assets. The size of the total population is normalized to one in
both countries:
Ny +N o = 1 and Ny∗ +N o∗ = 1 ,
where the asterisk denotes the developing country’s variables. We assume
that the old are in the majority in the industrialized country, while the
opposite holds for the developing country, that is N o > 0.5 and N o∗ < 0.5.
In both countries a homogeneous good is produced with a Cobb-Douglas
production function:
Y = AKαL1−α and Y ∗ = A˜(K∗)α(L∗)1−α .
The size of the capital stock owned by the old generation in the industrialized
country is k¯ · N o. Production in the developing country hinges on capital
inflows from the industrialized country (K∗ = k¯ · N o − K) since the devel-
oping country’s inhabitants own no capital. We assume that foreign direct
investment is administered by a mutual fund, which coordinates the single
investment decisions.
The young in both countries exogenously supply one unit of labor. We
set the depreciation rate to zero for simplicity.1 We assume that total fac-
tor productivity (TFP) in the industrialized country A exceeds TFP in the
1Note that this simplification does not drive our results. In the limiting case with full
depreciation, the net utility gain from expropriation is independent of the level of FDI.
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developing country. This results from a less favorable business climate, for in-
stance due to an inferior infrastructure, in the developing country. However,
capital flows from the industrialized country are accompanied by technologi-
cal expertise. Therefore, TFP A˜ exceeds the level A∗ the developing country
would achieve without the foreign expertise:
A˜ =
1
θ
A∗ with 0 < θ < 1 .
The foreign investors’ productivity thus not only hinges on the initial condi-
tions they find in the developing country (such as the state of the infrastruc-
ture and know-how, the regulatory burden etc.), but also on their know-how
and their capacity to cope with these conditions.
Defining M as labor migration from the developing to the industrialized
country, factor prices are given by
w = (1− α)A
(
K
Ny +M
)α
, r = αA
(
K
Ny +M
)α−1
,
w∗ = (1− α)A˜
(
K∗
Ny∗ −M
)α
and r∗ = αA˜
(
K∗
Ny∗ −M
)α−1 (1)
in the industrialized and the developing country respectively. 2
Each country’s government sets policy to maximize the respective median
voter’s utility. The policy decision in the developing country concerns the
expropriation of foreign capital. Expropriation refers to the seizure of the
capital stock, and, for simplicity, it is assumed to be always total. If there
were no costs of expropriation, the developing country would be subject to a
classical time-inconsistency problem and would always expropriate. Conse-
quently, no capital would flow there. However, expropriation usually comes
at some cost. As foreign investors lose control over invested capital after
expropriation, it is sensible to assume them to withdraw their expertise, as
in Eaton and Gersovitz (1984) as well as Harms and an de Meulen ().3 The
seized capital stock is still used for production, but TFP drops to A∗ in the
developing country, thereby lowering output and the young’s wages. The old
do not incur any cost from expropriation. We assume that the benefit from
2There is a large empirical literature on the effects of migration on wages, starting with
Card (1990). The size of factor price effects is contingent on the substitutability between
different factors of production and between immigrants and natives, see, for instance,
Ottaviano and Peri (2008). Assuming a more general CES production function would
allow a wider range of possible factor price elasticities with respect to migration and FDI.
3In a setting with a longer time horizon, one could also argue that expropriation reduces
future capital inflows, see Cole and English (1991) and Thomas and Worrall (1994).
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expropriation (the gross return to capital) is distributed equally among the
developing country’s old and those young who have not emigrated. Each
inhabitant of the developing country thus receives a transfer t with
t =
T
1−M =
(1 + θr∗)K∗
1−M . (2)
The government of the industrialized country decides on the number of
admitted immigrants. Immigration to the industrialized country affects its
citizens’ welfare in two ways. Firstly, it alters factor prices. The young gen-
eration clearly suffers since wages decline. The old generation benefits from
increasing capital returns on the part of capital invested at home k and suf-
fers from decreasing returns on that part invested in the foreign developing
country k∗. Be aware that k and k∗ do not denote the capital intensities
in production (K/L and K∗/L∗) but rather the capital used in home and
foreign production per investor (K/N o and K∗/N o). Secondly, we assume
that immigration causes a disutility d to all of the industrialized country’s
citizens, proportional to the number of immigrants M .4 This disutility pa-
rameter captures potential welfare effects of immigration not accounted for
in individual incomes in a tractable way. For instance, natives may resent an
increased heterogeneity of social norms and customs, as in Hillman (2002), or
immigration may reduce the utility derived from public goods, as in Alesina
and La Ferrara (2005). Individuals’ utility is linear in consumption:
U i = ci − d ·M and U i∗ = ci∗ , i = y, o ,
with
cy = w ,
co = k(1 + r) + k∗(1 + r∗) ,
and
cy∗ =

w in case of emigration
w∗ in case of non-expropriation
θw∗ + t in case of expropriation ,
co∗ =
{
e∗ in case of non-expropriation
e∗ + t in case of expropriation .
4We could also use the more general functional form dγ . Since the choice of γ does not
have any qualitative effect on our results we set γ equal to one. With γ = 1, the disutility
caused by immigration increases linearly with the population share of immigrants.
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We assume a sequence of events as illustrated in figure IV.1. First, the
industrialized country’s old allocate their capital to both countries and at the
same time, the industrialized country’s government determines maximum im-
migration. Second, the developing country’s young migrate before third, the
developing country’s government decides whether to expropriate the foreign
capital stock. Fourth, production and consumption take place. We solve
the model by backward induction, that is, we start with the expropriation
decision.
Capital Allocation
Immigration Quota
Migration
Expropriation Decision
t
Figure IV.1: Sequence of Events
This sequence of events is chosen for the following reasons. Expropriation
of the capital stock can only take place after capital has been installed.
We assume the expropriation decision to be taken right before production
starts, that is, after capital investment and labor migration. With respect to
capital allocation and migration policy, we begin by assuming simultaneity.
One could also argue that the implementation of migration policy decisions
requires a longer lead time than the allocation of capital.5 We therefore
extend our model to this sequential timing in section 6.
4 Equilibrium Policy
We now come to the determination of equilibrium migration and FDI. We
solve for the four equations determining the volume of individually optimal
and politically determined factor flows, starting with the expropriation de-
cision, which takes place in stage three. While we model four decisions, we
show that factor flows are always restricted by the two policy decisions: FDI
is restricted to the volume where the developing country abstains from ex-
propriation, and migration takes on the level the industrialized country’s old
median voter prefers. Note that high emigration from the developing country
may change the identity of the median voter there from a young to an old
individual.
5Assuming that the investment decision takes place before the migration policy decision
instead of simultaneity would yield exactly the same results, given that investors are
atomistic and behave symmetrically in equilibrium.
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Non-Expropriation Constraint
When deciding whether to expropriate in the third stage, the developing
country’s government faces given levels of capital imports K∗ and migration
M . We define the non-expropriation constraint K∗max as the level of FDI
for which the median voter in the developing country is indifferent between
expropriation and non-expropriation. If the median voter is old (because
of high emigration, that is M > Ny∗ − N o∗), any foreign capital is always
expropriated. We call the threshold value of migration for which there re-
main as many old as young individuals in the developing country M crit, with
M crit = Ny∗−N o∗. If M < M crit, the median voter in the developing country
is young. The young who have not emigrated benefit from the transfer like
the old, but additionally suffer from a reduced wage rate due to a drop in
TFP. A young median voter weakly prefers non-expropriation if the transfer
does not compensate for the wage loss:
(1− θ)w∗ ≥ t .
Using (2), this can be written as
(1− θ)w∗ ≥ K
∗
1−M +
K∗ · θr∗
1−M . (3)
An inflow of capital has three effects on expropriation preferences, a wage
effect (1−θ)w∗, a return effect K∗ ·θr∗/(1−M) and an effect on the seizable
capital stock K∗/(1 −M). Subtracting the return effect on both sides and
inserting (1) yields[
1−θ
θ
A∗(1− α)− αA∗(Ny∗ −M)/(1−M)
(Ny∗ −M)α
]
(K∗)α ≥ K
∗
1−M .
Note that the sign of the term in squared brackets on the left hand side is
independent of the level of FDI, K∗. A necessary condition for positive FDI
for all M between 0 and Ny∗ is that the wage effect exceeds the return effect,
which is fulfilled for sufficiently low θ:
θ ≤ 1− α
(1− α) + αNy∗ .
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This means that expropriation has to be costly.6 Solving for K∗ yields
K∗ ≤ (A∗) 11−α
[
1−θ
θ
(1− α)(1−M)− α(Ny∗ −M)
(Ny∗ −M)α
] 1
1−α
.
Consequently, we can write the upper bound for capital imports, the non-
expropriation constraint, as
K∗max =
0 if M > M
crit
(A∗)
1
1−α
[
1−θ
θ
(1−α)(1−M)−α(Ny∗−M)
(Ny∗−M)α
] 1
1−α
if M ≤M crit ,
(4)
for the case of an old and a young median voter respectively.
We can calculate the derivative of the young median voters’ non-expropriation
constraint with respect to emigration as
dK∗max
dM
=
(
K∗max
Ny∗ −M
)α [
1− θ
θ
A∗
(
α(1−M)
Ny∗ −M − 1
)
+ αA∗
]
. (5)
The sign of this derivative is ambiguous. A positive effect of emigration
on the critical level of FDI is sufficient for a unique equilibrium to exist
in the case of a young median voter in the developing country (see propo-
sition 1). Therefore, we assume the necessary and sufficient condition for
dK∗max/dM > 0 for all M between 0 and Ny∗ given by
θ >
Ny∗ − α
(1 + α)Ny∗ − α ,
to be fulfilled.
Emigration has three effects on the non-expropriation constraint. Firstly,
wages increase and so does the wage effect from expropriation. Secondly, cap-
ital returns and the return effect decrease. Both of these effects lower expro-
priation preferences. Thirdly, the number or recipients of a possible transfer
decreases, making expropriation more attractive for the median voter. The
parameter θ has two opposite effects on the derivative dK∗max/dM . Even
though the marginal effect on the wage loss becomes smaller if θ increases,
FDI to be distributed in case of expropriation decreases, as (4) shows.
In summary, expropriation has to be costly for non-expropriation compat-
ible FDI to be larger than zero. However, the level of FDI compatible with
6Note that relaxing our assumption of no depreciation would decrease expropriation
preferences due to a lower distributable capital stock. Given that the wage effect is larger
than the return effect, expropriation would never take place in the limiting case with a
depreciation rate of 100%.
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non-expropriation only increases in emigration if expropriation costs are not
too high, i.e. if θ is not too low. We have thus derived the non-expropriation
constraint, resulting from the expropriation decision in the last stage, and its
properties.7
Emigration Constraint
In the preceding stage, the developing country’s young take their migration
decision for a given level of FDI and for a given immigration policy in the
industrialized country. In the absence of any immigration restrictions they
would migrate until utility and thus wages in both countries are equal. This
yields an emigration constraint :
M opt =
(θA/A∗)1/α(k¯N o −K∗)Ny∗ −K∗Ny
(θA/A∗)1/α(k¯N o −K∗) +K∗ . (6)
It is declining in the level of FDI since FDI reduces wage differences between
both countries:
dM opt
dK∗
= −(θA/A
∗)1/α(k¯N o −K∗)(Ny +Ny∗)[
(θA/A∗)1/α(k¯N o −K∗) +K∗]2 < 0 .
However, potential migrants have to obey the limit on immigration set by
the industrialized country’s government, the immigration policy constraint
Mmax, which we derive in the next subsection. While the potential migrants
know the level of FDI, this is not the case for the industrialized country’s gov-
ernment which decides on immigration policy. In our model the immigration
restriction imposed by the industrialized country turns out to be binding, as
we show below.
Immigration Policy Constraint
Immigration policy is determined by the preferences of the industrialized
country’s median voter, who is an old individual. Immigration policy is set
simultaneously to the investors’ allocation of capital. Immigration from the
developing country raises the capital return on the part of capital invested
in the industrialized country and decreases the capital return on the part
7Note that less elastic reactions of factor prices to factor supplies would translate into
less elastic costs and benefits of expropriation in equation (3), implying a larger risk of
expropriation. The effect of a growing seizable capital stock dominates the wage and
return effects. Furthermore, weak reactions of factor prices may imply that expropriation
preferences increase with emigration, since the number of transfer recipients declines.
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invested in the developing country. Be aware that foreign capital returns
only accrue to the industrialized country’s investors if K∗ ≤ K∗max. For
any volume of FDI exceeding the non-expropriation compatible level, the
impact of migration on foreign capital returns is therefore not taken into
account. However, we only consider the former case, since it is only optimal
for investors to invest in the foreign country as long as returns are not expro-
priated (see below). Maximizing the old’s indirect utility function assuming
non-expropriation yields the following first-order condition for every value of
K∗ between zero and k¯N o:
k
dr
dM
+ k∗
dr∗
dM
= d , (7)
with
dr
dM
=
1− α
Ny +M
r and
dr∗
dM
= − 1− α
Ny∗ −Mr
∗ ,
and d denoting the non-monetary disutility related to a marginal increase in
immigration. Equation (7) illustrates that immigrants are admitted as long
as the marginal gain from immigration, k(dr/dM), outweighs the marginal
cost, −k∗(dr∗/dM) + d.8 The first-order condition can also be written as
α(w − w∗)
1−Ny = d . (8)
For unrestricted migration the wage rates in both countries are equal, and the
left-hand side is zero. This is a solution for the immigration policy constraint
only if d = 0, i.e. there are no costs of integrating immigrants. Intuitively,
Mmax must be smaller than unrestricted migration for any d exceeding zero.
Hence, we can abstract from the emigration constraint as equilibrium migra-
tion is always determined by the industrialized country’s policy.
For K∗ = 0, we can show that
Mmax = k¯
(
(1− α)αA
d
)1/α
(N o)(α−1)/α −Ny . (9)
With investment only taking place at home, the industrialized country’s old
favor admitting an infinite number of immigrants if there are no integration
costs. The marginal return gain of additional immigration increases with
the amount of capital each investor owns. The effect of a larger population
share of the old generation is ambiguous since it is not only tantamount to
a smaller domestic labor force but also implies a lower capital return level.
8Note that less elastic factor prices would imply that both marginal gains and costs
decrease. Mmax is then likely to be lower if the bulk of capital is invested at home.
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For any K∗ > 0, we cannot solve explicitly for Mmax. However, using the
implicit function theorem, we can show that the derivative of the industrial-
ized median voter’s preferred level of migration to FDI is
dMmax
dK∗
= −
r
Ny+M
+ r
∗
Ny∗−M
K
Ny+M
· r
Ny+M
+ K
∗
Ny∗−M · r
∗
Ny∗−M
< 0 . (10)
With larger capital exports, investors place a higher weight on foreign capital
returns. These become large for low levels of migration. Therefore, chosen
immigration is a declining function of FDI.
At the same time with the immigration policy decision, the industrialized
country’s old allocate their capital endowment. The investors have to take
the political expropriation decision of the developing country into account.
Investment Constraint
In the absence of expropriation risk, the industrialized country’s investors
would export the share of capital necessary to equalize capital returns in both
countries. We call the level of capital exports in the absence of expropriation
risk K∗opt, the investment constraint, with
K∗opt =
(A/A˜)
1
α−1 k¯ ·N o(Ny∗ −M)
(Ny +M) + (A/A˜)
1
α−1 (Ny∗ −M)
. (11)
Obviously, the difference in capital returns and thus the optimal level of
capital exports is lower the higher the immigration level, such that K∗opt
is a declining function of M . It is straightforward to understand that no
FDI exceeding the non-expropriation compatible level is an optimal choice.
This is because in case of expropriation, investors only receive a positive
return on the part of capital invested at home. Consequently, utility can be
increased by investing a larger fraction of capital at home and reducing FDI.
If the non-expropriation compatible level of FDI is not sufficient to equalize
returns, it does not pay to further reduce FDI, foregoing high capital returns
in the developing country. Therefore, actual FDI is given by the minimum of
K∗opt and K∗max. The assumption that investors’ capital is administered by
a mutual fund solves the coordination problem between investors of ensuring
that the sum of capital flows to the developing country does not exceed the
level compatible with the non-expropriation constraint.
If the median voter in the developing country is old the non-expropriation
constraint K∗max equals zero and thus always binds. However, in case of a
young median voter the individually optimal level of capital exports, K∗opt,
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is not necessarily higher than the policy-induced level K∗max since in the
interval M < M crit the former is a decreasing and the latter an increasing
function of migration. However, we make the assumption that at the critical
migration level M crit, the young-median-voter’s non-expropriation constraint
binds, i.e. K∗max(M crit) < K∗opt(M crit). Then the non-expropriation con-
straint also binds for M < M crit. Our equilibrium is thus characterized by
the two equations (4) and (7).
Equilibrium
In a benchmark situation without political constraints, production would
only take place in the country with the higher TFP, which is the industrial-
ized country. Investors take into account that migration reacts to the capital
allocation to equalize wages in both countries. Returns on capital are max-
imized if no FDI takes place, as then the entire workforce of the developing
country emigrates to the industrialized country. This rather extreme out-
come is due to the fact that we have not assumed any costs of migrating. In
the presence of migration costs, different combinations of migration and FDI
are possible, contingent on the relationship of TFP differences and migration
costs.
Conversely, our political economy model can be summarized as a game be-
tween the industrialized country’s investors and the industrialized country’s
government, subject to the non-expropriation constraint. K∗max(M) is the
investors’ best response to the government’s choice of immigration M . Hence,
in equilibrium (K∗,M) combinations are located on the non-expropriation
constraint where expropriation does not occur. Given no expropriation, the
government’s best response to any choice of FDI is given by the immigration
policy constraint Mmax|K∗ . The intersection of best responses then deter-
mines a Nash equilibrium. As we show below an additional equilibrium –
not given by the intersection of these two policy functions – may exist with
M < M crit. Figure IV.2 shows the two policy equations and the equations
for individually optimal migration and FDI in the absence of political con-
straints for α = 0.35, A = 1, A∗ = 0.6, θ = 0.75, Ny = 0.44, Ny∗ = 0.57 and
d = 0.18.
In choosing our benchmark parameters we adhere to common assumptions
in the literature. According to Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2003), the production
share of capital is usually set between 0.3 and 0.4, so our benchmark is
α = 0.35. We normalize TFP in the industrialized country A to 1, since
what matters for our analysis is the relative size of A, A˜ and A∗. According
to Dreher et al. (2007), developing countries’ average TFP relative to the US
is 0.53 if only official output is considered and 0.84 if the shadow economy is
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Figure IV.2: Migration and FDI in Equilibrium, d > dcrit
also taken into account. We set the developing country’s TFP to A∗ = 0.6
and the industrialized country’s investors’ TFP in the developing country
to the intermediate value A˜ = 0.8, which yields θ = 0.75. In order to
determine the relative sizes of the young and old generations, we look at
the United Nations’ Population Division’s statistics on children per woman.9
For the period of 2000-2005, total fertility in the world’s more developed
regions was about 1.6, while it was 2.6 for the world’s less developed regions
excluding the least developed regions. With the total population normalized
to one in both countries, the resulting sizes of the young generations are
Ny = 0.44 and Ny∗ = 0.57. We choose the level of the capital stock per
investor to be k¯ = 0.16, implying an autarky capital intensity of about 0.2
in the industrialized country. The disutility parameter d is, of course, rather
arbitrary since we have not explicitly modeled immigration-related costs. We
define a critical immigration cost dcrit, which solves the immigration policy
constraint (7) for M = M crit and K∗ = K∗max(M crit). Given that all other
parameters are set to their benchmark values, dcrit = 0.14.
For d > dcrit, figure IV.2 illustrates two equilibria, an old-median-voter
equilibrium labeled P ′ and a young-median-voter equilibrium labeled P . If
both equilibria exist, we have to compare the industrialized country’s old’s
indirect utility in order to determine which equilibrium is more plausible.10
9UNPD (2006)
10Although both equilibria may be realized, the one which generates higher utility for
both players can be seen as a focal point.
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Proposition 1 states the conditions for the existence of these two equilibria.
Proposition 1 Given that d ≥ dcrit, a young-median-voter equilibrium ex-
ists, as dK∗max/dM > 0. It is located at the intersection of K∗max|M≤Mcrit
and Mmax. Additionally, there is an old-median-voter equilibrium at (K∗ =
0,Mmax|K∗=0) if Mmax|K∗=0 > M crit. This is fulfilled for sufficiently small
d, i.e. d < (1−α)αAk¯
α
(2Ny∗+Ny−1)α·(1−Ny)1−α
Proof: Recall that the policy functions always determine the equilibrium.
Since with d ≥ dcrit, the developing country’s young median voter’s non-
expropriation constraint and the immigration policy constraint intersect at
M ≤ M crit, this is the young-median-voter equilibrium. It is unique if
Mmax(K∗ = 0) ≤ M crit. Then, the industrialized country never admits
more than M crit migrants and the median voter’s identity in the developing
country never changes. Conversely, if Mmax(K∗ = 0) > M crit, the intersec-
tion point of the immigration policy constraint with the old median voter’s
non-expropriation constraint, (K∗ = 0,Mmax|K∗=0), is also an equilibrium.
Note that if migration does not cause any cost (d = 0), the industrialized
country’s median voter would like to admit an infinite number of immigrants.
Nevertheless, Ny∗ is the upper bound for immigration. We find that the in-
dustrialized country’s old always prefer the young-median-voter equilibrium,
labeled P in figure IV.2. Starting from any point on the immigration policy
constraint, utility decreases as we move marginally along the curve, increasing
migration and decreasing FDI: the resulting utility change is approximately
given by
dU o =
∂U o
∂M
dM +
∂U o
∂K∗
dK∗ < 0 ,
where dM > 0 and dK∗ < 0 (see figure IV.2). Using the envelope theorem,
∂U o/∂M = 0, while ∂U o/∂K∗ > 0 since r∗ > r. Along Mmax points with
more FDI and less migration are thus clearly preferred.
If the industrialized country’s inhabitants are sufficiently averse to immi-
gration, the majority in the developing country is never reversed by labor
flows. However, it is not possible to exclude an old-median-voter equilibrium
theoretically. For the sake of completeness, we briefly discuss the case where
d < dcrit. For any d < dcrit, the immigration policy constraint and the non-
expropriation constraint intersect at some migration level larger than M crit.
Figure IV.3 shows the case d < dcrit (for d = 0.12).
Proposition 2 Given that d < dcrit, an old-median-voter equilibrium ex-
ists. Additionally, there may be a young-median-voter equilibrium which is
characterized by (M crit, K∗max(M crit)).
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Figure IV.3: Migration and FDI in Equilibrium, d < dcrit
Proof: As argued in the proof of proposition 1, (Mmax|K∗=0, K∗ = 0) is the
only possible equilibrium if migration exceeds its critical level. We cannot
theoretically exclude the existence of an additional equilibrium for migra-
tion lower or equal to its critical level. Given M ≤ M crit investors prefer
a level of FDI lower or equal to K∗max as otherwise expropriation occurs.
Within this area of possible equilibria, the highest utility is clearly achieved
at (M crit, K∗max(M crit)), the point closest to utility maximizing K∗opt and
Mmax. While the investors would like to export more, the median voter fa-
vors admitting more immigrants. However, increasing FDI and admitting
more immigrants would both lead to expropriation. In summary, neither the
investors nor the industrialized country’s median voter have an incentive to
deviate from point (M crit, K∗max(M crit)).
We cannot rank these two equilibria without further restricting the model
parameters: If M > M crit the old generation in the industrialized country
benefits from the high return to capital at home. However, investors forgo
proceeds in the developing country. If this opportunity cost is high (due to
a high K∗max) and the difference between Mmax|K∗=0 and M crit is low, the
young-median-voter equilibrium is preferred to the old-median-voter equilib-
rium.
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5 Comparative Statics
We now come to the effects of marginal changes in the model parameters
on the young-median-voter equilibrium. Changes in the immigration policy
constraint also apply to the old-median-voter equilibrium, while the old me-
dian voter’s non-expropriation constraint always restricts FDI to zero. In the
absence of political mobility constraints, larger demographic diversity would
clearly boost both capital and labor movements. Now the level of factor flows
is determined by policy.
A larger share of the old generation in the industrialized country’s popu-
lation implies a larger capital stock k¯N o. As N o does not have any impact on
expropriation preferences, FDI would only increase if migration rose. How-
ever, a larger share of old does not unambiguously boost migration. On the
one hand, with an exogenous capital endowment per investor k¯ and given
FDI K∗ = K∗max, the share of k¯ invested at home must increase. Investors
consequently place a higher weight on domestic capital returns, preferring
higher migration. On the other hand, the impact of immigration on do-
mestic capital returns is also altered. This change in the derivative is given
by
∂2r
∂M∂N o
=
1− α
(Ny +M)2
r +
1− α
Ny +M
∂r
∂N o
with
∂r
∂N o
= − 1− α
Ny +M
r
[
1 +
k¯(Ny +M)
k¯N o −K∗
]
< 0 .
Intuitively, the marginal effect of migration on the capital return in the in-
dustrialized country may be weakened by a larger share of old because the
capital return itself is lowered not only by a decrease in the labor force but
also by an increase in the capital stock. In summary, it is possible that a
higher fraction of old in the industrialized country implies higher migration
and thereby higher FDI, but this need not be the case. Using, again, the
implicit function theorem, the derivative of Mmax with respect to N o can be
shown to be
dMmax
dN o
=
k∗
No
[
r
Ny+M
+ r
∗
Ny∗−M
]
+ k 1−α
Ny+M
[
r
Ny+M
+ ∂r
∂No
]
k α
Ny+M
r
Ny+M
+ k∗ α
Ny∗−M
r∗
Ny∗−M
.
For our benchmark parameter values, a marginal increase in N o would reduce
factor flows. However, a substantial increase of the share of the old generation
to 0.71 would enhance them, see figure 4(a). Nevertheless, factor flows are
still restrained by policy.
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Demographic diversity may also be caused by a high share of the young
generation in the developing country. A larger Ny∗ affects the wage and
return effects of FDI in the same way as lower emigration since both are
equivalent to a larger labor force L∗. Wages decrease while capital returns
increase, making expropriation more worthwhile for a given level of migra-
tion:
∂K∗max
∂Ny∗
= −αA∗
(
K∗max
Ny∗ −M
)α [
1 +
1− θ
θ
1−M
Ny∗ −M
]
< 0 .
Conversely, the direct effect of a larger L∗ on immigration policy is unam-
biguously positive. For a given international allocation of capital a larger
labor force in the developing country reduces the negative marginal effect of
emigration on the capital return there. The derivative is
∂Mmax
∂Ny∗
=
k∗ α(1−α)
Ny∗−M
r∗
Ny∗−M
k α
Ny+M
r
Ny+M
+ k∗ α
Ny∗−M
r∗
Ny∗−M
> 0 .
Note that expropriation preferences in the developing country are weaker
the more young workers emigrate, counteracting the direct negative effect of
Ny∗ on FDI. On the contrary, the indirect effect on migration via lower FDI
reinforces the direct effect. We can compute the total effects from
dMmax
dNy∗
=
∂Mmax
∂Ny∗
+
dMmax
dK∗
· ∂K
∗max
∂Ny∗
> 0 and
dK∗max
dNy∗
=
∂K∗max
∂Ny∗
+
dK∗max
dMmax
· ∂M
max
∂Ny∗
< 0 ,
using (5) and (10). Whereas the total effect of a larger Ny∗ on migration
is obviously positive, the direct negative effect on FDI can easily be shown
to dominate the positive migration-induced indirect effect, yielding a lower
non-expropriation compatible level of FDI, see figure 4(b), where the new
share of the young generation is set to 0.62.
Demographic structures do not only differ between industrialized and de-
veloping regions but also within seemingly homogeneous groups of countries.
We have argued that the extent of international demographic diversity has
no univocally enhancing effect on factor flows in a situation with politically
induced mobility barriers. Analogously, there is a wide technological spread
within less developed regions. Hence, we now investigate how factor move-
ments are determined by the extent of technological diversity or of differences
in productivity. In the absence of mobility constraints a developing country
would attract more FDI and also more labor the higher TFP A˜. While we
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(a) Effects of a larger No
(b) Effects of a larger Ny∗
Figure IV.4: Effects of N o and Ny∗ on Equilibrium Migration and FDI
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use TFP in the industrialized country as a numeraire, the investors’ produc-
tivity in the developing country A˜ is determined by the initial conditions in
the developing country A∗ as well as by investors’ capacity to cope with these
conditions θ, as we pointed out in section 3.
The non-expropriation constraint is relaxed as the developing country
becomes more productive:
dK∗max
dA∗
=
1
1− α
1
A∗
K∗max > 0 .
The wage and return effect of FDI both increase by the same factor. Since
the capital stock effect of FDI is not affected by A∗, the costs of expropriation
increase by more than the benefits. Recall that the wage effect is larger than
the return effect for any positive level of K∗max. The relaxation of the non-
expropriation constraint hinges on the wage loss increasing with A∗, which
holds because the productivity gap A˜ − A∗ = [(1− θ)/θ]A∗ increases with
A∗. However, the direct effect on migration is negative:
∂Mmax
∂A∗
= − k
∗ α
A∗
1−α
Ny∗−M r
∗
k α
Ny+M
r
Ny+M
+ k∗ α
Ny∗−M
r∗
Ny∗−M
< 0 .
The marginal effect of migration on the capital return in the developing
country is enhanced by a larger A∗ because the capital return itself is higher.
The indirect effect on migration via FDI is also negative, such that migration
unambiguously declines. On the contrary, the positive direct effect on FDI
is counteracted by declining migration. As a result the sign of the effect of
A∗ on K∗max is actually ambiguous. The total effects are given by:
dMmax
dA∗
=
∂Mmax
∂A∗
+
dMmax
dK∗
· ∂K
∗max
∂A∗
< 0 and
dK∗max
dA∗
=
∂K∗max
∂A∗
+
dK∗max
dMmax
· ∂M
max
∂A∗
Q 0 .
For our benchmark parameter values an increase of A∗ leads to reduced FDI
flows. Our model thus replicates a result from the empirical literature on
the determinants of expropriation: the effect of a country’s gross domestic
product on expropriation risk is curvilinear, see Jodice (1980) and Li (2009)
among others. Expropriation rarely occurs in rich developed countries, which
use more subtle ways of appropriation foreign returns. Meanwhile, the least
developed countries lack the technological know-how necessary to compensate
the productivity and wage increments FDI involves.
A low θ implies a large difference between A˜ and A∗. If θ increases, A˜
converges to A∗ and less FDI is feasible: the wage income absent expropri-
ation decreases, while seized capital returns and wage earnings in case of
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expropriation do not change. An increment in θ thus attenuates the wage
effect but leaves the return effect unchanged. Expropriation is less costly
since the productivity gap A˜−A∗ = [(1− θ)/θ]A∗ is smaller. The derivative
of K∗max with respect to θ is given by
∂K∗max
∂θ
= −1−M
(θ)2
(
K∗max
Ny∗ −M
)α
< 0 .
While investments in the developing country become less secure if θ increases,
this only holds for a given level of migration. However, since A˜ decreases
with θ, the marginal capital return loss from developing-country emigration
is reduced. Consequently, there is a positive direct effect of θ on migration:
∂Mmax
∂θ
=
k∗ 1
θ
1−α
Ny∗−M r
∗
k α
Ny+M
r
Ny+M
+ k∗ α
Ny∗−M
r∗
Ny∗−M
> 0 .
This positive effect on migration counteracts the increased risk of expropri-
ation. Thus, while the total effect on migration is unambiguously positive,
the non-expropriation compatible level of FDI may increase or decrease:
dMmax
dθ
=
∂Mmax
∂θ
+
dMmax
dK∗
· ∂K
∗max
∂θ
> 0 and
dK∗max
dθ
=
∂K∗max
∂θ
+
dK∗max
dMmax
· ∂M
max
∂θ
Q 0 .
Using again simulations based on our benchmark parameter values we find
that increasing θ leads to a reduction of FDI.
The political economy of factor movements is not only determined by the
model parameters A∗ and θ but by d as well. The parameter d raises the
cost of immigration the respective median voter bears. Naturally, the higher
individuals’ disutility from integrating immigrants, the more restrictive is
immigration policy. A policy that lowers this immigration related disutility
would not only spur the integration of immigrants but also protect industri-
alized countries’ FDI flows. Remember that this only holds as long as the
young are in the majority in the developing country.
6 Extension: Equilibrium Policy in a Sequen-
tial Setting
We now investigate the sensitivity of the model results to the timing of the
capital allocation and migration policy decisions. As we argued above, it is
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quite plausible to assume that the implementation of migration policy deci-
sions takes longer than the allocation of capital. Therefore, we now elaborate
on the young-median-voter equilibrium with the immigration policy decision
taking place before the capital allocation decision. The old-median-voter
equilibrium is not contingent on the timing of decisions. Since a migration
level above M crit always corresponds to zero FDI, the optimal immigration
level is still given by equation (9).
In this setting, the government in the industrialized country anticipates
how investors react to the immigration policy decision: K∗ = min{K∗opt(M),
K∗max(M)}, still assuming that capital is administered by a mutual fund.
Recall that we made the assumption that at the critical immigration level
M crit, and thus for all levels of migration, the non-expropriation constraint
binds. Consequently, the median voter’s decision problem can be written as
Max
M
k¯N o −K∗max(M)
N o
(1 + r) +
K∗max(M)
N o
(1 + r∗)− d ·M ,
where r = αA
(
k¯N o −K∗max(M)
Ny +M
)α−1
and
r∗ = α · 1
θ
A∗
(
K∗max(M)
Ny∗ −M
)α−1
.
The first-order condition for a maximum reduces to
α
1−Ny
[
(r∗ − r) ∂K
∗max
∂M
+ (w − w∗)
]
= d . (12)
Comparing equation (12) to equation (8), it is easy to verify that migration
is now higher given that r∗ > r. The difference is that the median voter
can now loosen the non-expropriation constraint by choosing a higher level
of migration. The industrialized country’s old favor increasing FDI if r∗ >
r, implying that FDI is restricted by the non-expropriation constraint. In
summary, this sequence of decisions results in higher levels of both migration
and FDI.
7 Conclusion
This contribution has explicitly accounted for endogenous policies determined
by immigration and expropriation preferences. The novel feature of our ap-
proach is the modeling of the interplay of policies in limiting factor flows. We
have set up a one-period model of two countries with heterogeneous agents,
young and old. Accounting for demographic diversity, we have assumed an
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old median voter in the industrialized country but a young median voter in
the developing country.
In equilibrium, factor flows are politically restricted, leaving room for effi-
ciency gains from removing mobility barriers. For instance, if the immigration-
related disutility that natives incur can be lowered, both migration and FDI
increase. This clearly enhances efficiency. This result is subject to one caveat,
as there is the possibility that emigration changes the median voter’s identity
in the developing country. Then FDI drops to zero, as the expropriation of
foreign capital is certain. We therefore conclude that even though migration
protects an aging country’s stock of FDI, the aging country does not benefit
from completely depriving host countries of their labor force.
While larger demographic diversity would boost factor flows in the ab-
sence of mobility constraints, it has an ambiguous effect in our setting. A
large share of the old generation in the industrialized country implies that a
large share of capital has to be invested at home. Capital returns achieved
at home thus receive a higher weight, enhancing immigration preferences.
However, it is possible that the positive effect of migration on these capital
returns is now weaker. If migration does increase, this also has an indirect
positive effect on FDI. A large share of the young generation in the developing
country has an unambiguously negative effect on FDI and an unambiguously
positive effect on migration. It is equivalent to a large labor force, implying
low wages, and low wage losses in case of expropriation, and high capital
returns to be distributed in case of expropriation. The positive effect on mi-
gration stems from the fact that high capital returns also lead to a reduced
negative marginal effect of emigration. Enhanced migration attenuates the
negative effect on FDI.
The model may further be extended in various directions. Firstly, we
could allow for economic mobility barriers. If moving is costly for the mi-
grants, our results do not change, however, unless the (political) demand for
migrants would exceed individually optimal migration. Secondly, a wider
range of elasticities could be allowed for in production. With weaker factor
price effects, factor flows would be further restricted, and migration might
not ease expropriation risk. Thirdly, since in industrialized countries much
of the debate concerning migration and capital investment is related to the
sustainability of pension systems, it would be promising to introduce a pen-
sion system to the model. Finally, replacing the median voter framework by
a probabilistic voting framework would allow for an impact of both genera-
tions’ preferences on equilibrium policies.
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Part V
Population Aging and
Individual Attitudes toward
Immigration:
Disentangling Age, Cohort and
Time Effects
Lena Calahorrano
Abstract
In the face of rising old-age dependency ratios in industrialized coun-
tries like Germany, politicians and their electorates discuss the loosen-
ing of immigration policies as one policy option to ensure the sustain-
ability of public social security systems. The question arises whether
this policy option is feasible in aging countries: older individuals are
typically found to be more averse to immigration. However, cross-
sectional investigations may confound age with cohort effects. This
investigation uses the 1999-2008 waves of the German Socio-Economic
Panel to separate the effect of age on immigration attitudes from co-
hort and also from time effects. Over the life cycle stated immigration
concerns are predicted to increase well into retirement and decrease
afterward. Relative to other issues, immigration concerns are found
to actually decrease over the life cycle.
JEL classification: D78, F22, J10
Keywords: Immigration, Demographic Change, Political Economy
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1 Introduction
Rising old-age dependency ratios in industrialized countries like Germany
pose a challenge to the viability of public pension and health systems. The
loosening of immigration policies is often seen as one policy option to counter
this challenge. The United Nations report on replacement migration (UNPD
2001) calculates that in order to keep the ratio of 15 to 64 year olds to over
64 year olds in the 15 old European Union countries constant until 2050,
immigration would have to be more than 60 times its forecast. Such a huge
increase in immigration is clearly unrealistic. However, other investigations
have shown that even modest increases in immigration can have positive fiscal
impacts, especially if immigrants are selected according to age and skill, see,
for instance, Storesletten (2000) or Bonin et al. (2000).
As Rodrik (1995) argues, ultimately, voters’ individual preferences are
key to policy outcomes in any democracy.1 In countries with aging popu-
lations, older individuals’ attitudes should play an increasingly important
role in shaping policy. This paper looks at the impact of age (and other
characteristics correlated with age) on individual attitudes toward immigra-
tion. It uses a large representative panel survey, the German Socioeconomic
Panel (SOEP). The sample is limited to those individuals eligible to vote,
i.e. adults with German nationality.
Previous empirical investigations of the determinants of immigration at-
titudes have found negative or hump-shaped effects of age, without distin-
guishing life cycle from cohort or time effects, however. In any cross section,
an individual’s age and birth year are perfectly correlated. Yet they may
have differential effects on attitudes toward immigration. For instance, a
negative estimated effect of age on immigration attitudes is consistent with
individuals growing more averse to immigration over the life cycle. But it is
also consistent with older cohorts of individuals being less open toward im-
migrants, and growing older not having any effect on immigration attitudes
at all.
In any time series in contrast, the effect of growing older on attitudes
would be confounded with time effects. An increase in an individuals’s op-
position to immigration from one period to the next could be attributed to
the fact that the individual has grown older or to changes in macroeconomic
circumstances. Consequently, panel data are necessary to isolate the effect
of growing older from cohort and time effects.
This paper follows two approaches to isolate the effect of age in an un-
1A recent publication modeling the mapping of individual immigration attitudes to
immigration policy outcomes is Facchini and Mayda (2008).
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balanced panel of German voters. Firstly, it includes year of birth or dummy
variables for survey year as explanatory variables in addition to age. Sec-
ondly, models which only use the within variation of the data, the variation
in time for each individual, are estimated.
Whereas individuals living in areas with low local birth rates have been
found to be less averse to immigration (see Ivlevs ), the present investigation
finds mixed evidence for the political feasibility of policies aiming at increas-
ing immigration as a country is aging. On the one hand, predicted concerns
about immigration (based on the estimation sample) decrease only past age
70. On the other hand, relative to other areas of concern, predicted immigra-
tion becomes less prominent over the life cycle, whereas it is more prominent
among older than among younger generations of individuals in the sample.
Survey year is significant, with individuals most worried about immigration
when unemployment is high. There is no time trend in predicted immigration
concerns nor in the impact that different respondent characteristics have on
immigration concerns.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes
previous findings on the political economy of immigration and on the deter-
minants of immigration attitudes. The data and the empirical approach are
introduced in section 3. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 summarizes
the most important findings and outlines directions for further research.
2 Background and Related Literature
Theoretical research suggests that on economic grounds old individuals should
be more open to immigration than younger ones. Assuming that immigration
is predominantly labor migration, immigrants can be considered to be substi-
tutes to workers and complements to (older) capital owners. The translation
of heterogeneous interests among natives endowed with different amounts of
capital into immigration policies is modeled by Benhabib (1996) and Mazza
and van Winden (1996), for instance.
In addition to benefiting from an increase in capital returns, the closer
an individual gets to the end of her life cycle the less she should be worried
about immigrant workers who potentially have a higher number of offspring
than natives changing the political balance in the future. The role of immi-
gration in shaping the political balance plays a prominent role in dynamic
political-economy models of immigration, see, e.g., Dolmas and Huffman
(2004), Ortega (2005, 2010) and Sand and Razin (2007).
The conjecture that older natives are the ones who benefit from immigra-
tion is subject to some caveats, however. Firstly, the scope for immigration
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to have an impact on factor returns diminishes when the movement of capital
and goods is taken into account, see Hillman and Weiss (1999) and Calahor-
rano and an de Meulen (2009). However, there is evidence for negative effects
of immigration on wages and/or employment, documented, for example, by
Borjas (2003) and Angrist and Kugler (2003).
Secondly, the impact of immigration on consumption levels is also miti-
gated by pay-as-you-go pensions and contingent on the design of the pension
system, see, e.g., Scholten and Thum (1996), Haupt and Peters (1998) and
Calahorrano (2010). With flexible benefits, immigration has no effect on
contributions and an ambiguous effect on benefits since it has offsetting ef-
fects on current wages and on the number of contributors to social security.
With fixed pension benefits, native workers benefit from sharing the burden
of pension contributions with immigrant workers.
Thirdly, immigrants who do not find employment are a fiscal burden on
the welfare state and thus for natives of all ages. In this case, the design of
the welfare system determines whether individuals with high or low incomes
are most affected, as Facchini and Mayda (2009) explain.
Finally, immigration attitudes are shaped by non-economic as well as
economic motives, and it is likely that these non-economic effects vary by
age. For instance, older individuals may be more wary of change in general
or more opposed to changes in social norms and customs.
In the last 15 years, a number of investigations have addressed labor mar-
ket, welfare state and non-economic concerns. For the US, Espenshade and
Hempstead (1996) and Citrin et al. (1997) test various hypotheses about
the factors influencing immigration attitudes, using a CBS News / New York
Times poll and the National Election Study, respectively. Both studies doc-
ument a significant link between education and immigration attitudes: more
educated individuals are less likely to favor reducing the number of admitted
immigrants.2
This finding has two possible explanations. Firstly, education is likely
to enhance tolerance or a group norm of tolerance. Secondly, in line with
the predictions of neoclassical labor market models, high skilled natives are
complements rather than substitutes to immigrants. This is the case if immi-
grants are less skilled than natives (or if there are increasing returns to scale
to skilled labor as argued in World Bank 2008). The finding is in line with
the results of virtually all other investigations. Additionally, several authors
find evidence for the validity of the second explanation: education plays a
larger role for those in the labor force than those outside the labor force, see,
2However, in the poll data, individuals who dropped out of high school were even less
likely to favor reducing the number of immigrants.
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e.g., Kessler (2001), Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and O’Rourke and Sinnott
(2006).
Scheve and Slaughter (2001) systematically test the predictions of various
international economy models concerning the distributional effects of immi-
gration (and thus immigration preferences), with data from the US National
Election Study. They find strong support for the Heckscher-Ohlin3 model
and the factor-proportions analysis model, which predict an opposition of
low skilled native workers to low skilled immigration but not for the so called
area-analysis model, which assumes geographically segmented labor markets.
Mayda (2006) and O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006) conduct similar anal-
yses based on cross-country data, presuming that the estimated impact of
skill on immigration attitudes should be contingent on the shares of high
and low skilled workers in the population: being high skilled should have
a stronger impact in countries with a high share of high skilled, attracting
predominantly low skilled immigrants. The authors’ results bear out this
presumption.
Additionally, education plays a minor role in countries with an unequal
income distribution, see O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006). Due to a high skill
premium these countries can be assumed to attract skilled migrants. Fur-
thermore, individuals in occupations with a high share of foreign workers are
more likely to oppose immigration, see Mayda (2006).
Dustmann and Preston (2005) and Facchini and Mayda (2009) simulta-
neously model the impact of immigration on the labor market and on the
welfare state. Facchini and Mayda (2009) predict that if welfare taxes rather
than benefits are flexible, in richer countries (typically characterized by low
skilled immigration) skill should have a positive impact on immigration pref-
erences and income a negative one. The reverse should be true for poorer
countries. Since skill and income are highly positively correlated, the esti-
mated income coefficient is significantly positive when skills are not accounted
for. However, when Facchini and Mayda (2009) include both variables and
their interactions with per capita GDP, the predictions of the model with
flexible welfare taxes and fixed benefits are confirmed.
Using data from the European Social Survey, Dustmann and Preston
(2005) find that fiscal concerns matter more than labor market concerns.
Facchini and Mayda (2009) reach less clear conclusions based on data from
the International Social Survey Program. The importance of fiscal concerns
is also shown by Dustmann and Preston (2007), based on British data. Mean-
3According to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, large immigration “shocks” may induce lower
wages because a different set of goods is produced, whereas small shocks only alter the
produced quantities of the different goods.
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while, cross-country differences are also the focus of Bauer et al. (2000), who
show that these differences cannot be ascribed to respondents’ characteristics
but are largely due to different immigration policies.
Individuals’ attitudes toward immigration may further be affected by
their preference for homogeneous social norms and customs, as in Hillman
(2002). Dustmann and Preston (2007) show that in Britain opposition to im-
migration increases with ethnic and cultural distance to immigrants. Several
other studies document the importance of non-economic factors in shaping
immigration attitudes (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996, Chandler and Tsai
2001, Kessler 2001, Gang et al. 2002 and Mayda 2006 among others). Chan-
dler and Tsai (2001) find that besides education, perceived cultural threats
were the most important factor and Mayda (2006) finds that non-economic
factors explained a larger share of the variance in attitudes than economic
factors. Tucci (2005) discusses the “contact hypothesis”, which assumes that
contact with immigrants reduces prejudice.
A recent study on immigration attitudes explicitly takes into account the
role of population aging, see Ivlevs (). Linking survey data from Latvia to
data on local birth rates, Ivlevs () shows that individuals living in areas with
low birth rates are less opposed to immigration. He presumes that local birth
rates affect perceptions of national demographics and thereby perceptions of
the necessity to make up for smaller cohorts of native workers by recruiting
immigrant workers.
Virtually all other investigations include individual age as a control vari-
able. Most investigations find a negative age effect, see, for instance, Chan-
dler and Tsai (2001) for the US, Tucci (2005) for Germany, and Facchini
and Mayda (2009) using the International Social Survey Program. However,
also using the International Social Survey Program, Bauer et al. (2000) find
that older people are more likely to think that immigrants are good for the
economy, which is in line with labor market models.
Additionally, Brenner (2007) documents a sign change in the estimated
coefficients of different age groups after accounting for family-fixed effects,
whereas Miguet (2008) estimates a positive effect of age on votes cast for
anti-immigration policies in 1988 but a U-shaped effect of age in 2000.
A reverse U-shaped (hump-shaped) age effect on opposition to immigra-
tion is found in some other papers, for instance, in Espenshade and Hemp-
stead (1996) with individuals most opposed between ages 24 and 45, and in
Ivlevs () with individuals most opposed between ages 50 in regions with low
birth rates and 87 in regions with high birth rates. Although O’Rourke and
Sinnott (2006) estimate a hump-shaped effect of age, they find that predicted
opposition would only decrease beyond age 100.
The estimated effect of age thus appears to be highly sensitive to the
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functional form imposed and to the included covariates. The present analysis
attempts to include in the estimations all relevant variables correlated with
age, such as income, wealth, health and life satisfaction. Additionally, it
attempts to disentangle age from cohort and time effects. Due to the panel
dimension of the data used, it is possible to include year of birth or time
dummies as explanatory variables in addition to age. As an alternative, a
model which only uses the within variation of the data is estimated.
3 Data and Empirical Specification
Most previous analyses of immigration attitudes use cross-sectional data. In
order to identify the effect of growing older on immigration attitudes and
to isolate it from the effect of belonging to a given cohort, it is, however,
necessary to use panel data.
The present analysis is based on data from the 2008 release of the SOEP
for the years 1999 to 2008.4 The SOEP is a large representative panel survey,
conducted on an annual basis, in which respondents have been asked about
their attitudes toward immigration since 1999. It consists of several subsam-
ples, starting with the original sample drawn in 1984. Refreshment samples
were drawn in subsequent years to compensate for sample attrition. How-
ever, attrition is limited: out of the originally interviewed 5, 921 households
comprising 12, 245 individuals, 3, 154 households and 5, 626 individuals were
still interviewed in 2008.5
Three subsamples deliberately oversample certain groups of the popu-
lation. Whereas the “high income” sample was excluded for the present
analysis, respondents from the two immigrant samples were included if they
had acquired German nationality. Since the analysis focuses on the voting
population, it also excludes individuals below age 18 (the voting age). Out
of the remaining 181, 326 person-year observations, two were excluded be-
cause of missing information on their year of birth and 1, 496 (less than 1%)
because of missing information on their attitudes toward immigration. The
baseline sample thus consists of 179, 828 (person-year) observations.
The variable of interest is constructed from the question “What is your
attitude toward the following areas - are you concerned about them?”, where
one of the mentioned areas is immigration to Germany. The possible an-
4The data used in this paper were extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz
for Stata. PanelWhiz (http://www.PanelWhiz.eu) was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-
DeNew (john@PanelWhiz.eu). See Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2006) for details. Any data
or computational errors in this paper are my own.
5For a detailed data description see Wagner, Frick, and Schupp (2007).
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swers to this question are ordinal, ranging from very concerned, somewhat
concerned to not concerned.6 For the empirical analysis, the answers are
coded 3, 2, and 1, respectively, such that higher values correspond to more
concerns.
There is quite some variation in the given answers, between individuals
and across time. Tables V.1 and V.2 display some summary statistics for the
question “Are you concerned about immigration to Germany?”. Overall 31%
of the answers in the sample were “very concerned”, 46% were “somewhat
concerned” and 23% were “not concerned”. However, almost 58% of respon-
dents said at least once that they were very concerned, while 48% were not
concerned at least once. Out of those somewhat concerned, about 58% were
always somewhat concerned.
Immigration Concerns Overall At Least Once Always
very concerned 31.12 57.58 53.29
somewhat concerned 45.95 78.76 57.63
not concerned 22.93 48.31 49.53
Percent of very concerned, somewhat concerned and not concerned answers in the
estimation sample. Percent of respondents who stated to be very concerned, some-
what concerned and not concerned at least once. Percent of respondents who always
stated to be very concerned, somewhat concerned and not concerned.
Table V.1: Shares of Immigration Concerns
The share of those who were very concerned in one year and not concerned
in the next is very low, see table V.2. The same holds for the transition
from being not concerned to being very concerned. However, about 33% of
respondents who were either very concerned or not concerned said that they
were somewhat concerned in the following year.
very somewhat not
Immigration Concerns concerned concerned concerned
very concerned 61.45 33.24 5.31
somewhat concerned 21.53 61.27 17.20
not concerned 6.90 33.26 59.83
Percent of respondents with a given stated concern in one period who stated to be
very concerned, somewhat concerned and not concerned in the next period.
Table V.2: Transitions for Immigration Concerns
6Tucci (2005) and Brenner (2007) have used this variable for analyzing attitudes toward
immigration.
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There is no natural scale for measuring immigration concerns. The origi-
nal SOEP question allows respondents to choose between three ordered cat-
egories. The distance between any two categories need not be equal (or
meaningful at all). However, one can think of stated immigration concerns
depending on latent continuous concerns about immigration. With y∗it as
latent concerns and yit as stated concerns, it holds that
y∗it = µ+ αi + x
′
itβ + εit (1)
yit =

1 if −∞ < y∗it ≤ γ1
2 if γ1 < y
∗
it ≤ γ2
3 if y∗it > γ2
. (2)
Respondents state that they are “somewhat concerned” if their latent
concern exceeds some threshold γ1 and state that they are “very concerned”
if their latent concern exceeds a higher threshold, γ2. The parameters µ, β
and γ = (γ1, γ2)’ can then be chosen such as to maximize the likelihood of
observing the sample on hand. This requires an assumption on the distri-
bution of εi. Assuming a standard normal distribution function results in
the ordered probit model, whereas assuming a standard logistic distribution
function results in the ordered logit model. To identify the different parame-
ter values, an additional normalization constraint is necessary. A commonly
imposed constraint (applied also in this investigation) is to set µ equal to
zero. The effect of the constant is then absorbed into the thresholds γ.
Due to the panel dimension of the data, age and year of birth or age and
dummy variables for survey year can simultaneously be included in the vector
of explanatory variables xit. An alternative approach to isolate the effect
of individual age is to estimate a transformed model, based on the within
variation only (the variation in time for each individual). However, there are
to date no pre-programed routines to incorporate this kind of transformation
into ordered models. Therefore, the following transformed model is estimated
by OLS:
yit − y¯i + y¯ = µ+ (xit − x¯i + x¯)′ β + (εit − ε¯i + ε¯) . (3)
Besides identifying the effect of age on immigration attitudes over the
life-cycle, this model has the advantage that it eliminates any time-constant
individual heterogeneity αi which may be correlated with observable individ-
ual characteristics included in xit and is otherwise subsumed into the error
term. Equation (3) thus corresponds to a fixed effects (FE) model.
The SOEP includes information on additional areas people may be con-
cerned about. Respondents are asked some questions with regard to their
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own situation (their economic situation, their health and their job security,
given that they were employed) and several questions on macro issues (gen-
eral economic development, environmental protection, maintaining peace,
crime in Germany and hostility toward foreigners in Germany). Since 2004,
the SOEP also includes concerns about the enlargement of the European
Union to the east, and since 2008 it includes concerns about terrorism.
Table V.5 in the appendix compares summary statistics for all categories
of concerns. On average, respondents are most worried about crime, eco-
nomic development and maintaining peace and least worried about their own
situation. Note that immigration concerns have the largest standard devia-
tion among all concerns. Stated immigration concerns thus reflect more than
general worries.
However, the age pattern in average concerns is quite similar to the age
pattern of immigration concerns as described below, see the left panel of
figure V.1. Consequently, it is important to avoid confounding a life cycle
effect on opposition to immigration with a life cycle effect on general worries
or life satisfaction. In fact, life satisfaction has been shown to follow a U-
shaped pattern in age, see, for instance, Clark, Oswald, and Warr (1996) and
Blanchflower and Oswald (2008).
Both life satisfaction and other areas of concerns are thus included as
controls in the regressions. As a robustness check, estimation results exclud-
ing other areas of concerns are presented. An alternative approach is using
the difference between stated immigration concerns and other areas of stated
concerns as a measure of immigration attitudes. Both measures are proxies
for “true” immigration attitudes.
The left panel of figure V.1 shows mean immigration concerns by age.
It reveals a hump-shaped correlation, with opposition to immigration at its
strongest among the 70 year olds, and a lot of variation past age 85, probably
due to the low number of observations. This panel also plots the age profile
of an index of concerns with respect to the other areas, excluding EU enlarge-
ment, terrorism and job security, which were not asked of all respondents in
all ten years.
The right panel of figure V.1 isolates the correlation between year of
birth and immigration concerns. It seems to be the case that those born
around 1930 are most concerned about immigration. However, the hump
shape exhibits far more variation than the one plotted in the left panel.7
Additionally, there is quite some time variation in mean immigration at-
titudes, see figure V.2. Immigration concerns reach a peak in 2005, which
7Indeed, although the estimated effect of birth year is quite strong in all regressions,
its sign turns out not to be not robust.
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Figure V.1: Immigration Concerns as a Function of Age and Year of Birth
The figures show mean concerns by age and by year of birth. “Immigration” denotes concerns about
immigration to Germany. “Index” denotes average concerns over the following categories: economic devel-
opment, the environment, world peace, crime, the situation of foreigners in Germany and the respondent’s
own economic situation and health.
is also the year with the highest unemployment rate in the time frame con-
sidered. Contrary to Gang et al. (2002), who document an increase in
opposition to immigration from 1988 to 1997, the ten periods observed in
the SOEP do not suggest a time trend.
Table V.6 in the appendix shows summary statistics for the other explana-
tory variables included in xit. The theoretical background sketched above
presumes that individuals who draw social security incomes and individuals
who own (financial) assets are more likely to be in favor of immigration.
Therefore, information on income and asset ownership is taken into account.
Income variables are taken from the SOEP’s cross-national equivalent files,
which contain imputed values easily comparable to income data from other
data sets. Household income is used instead of personal income such as labor
income in order to avoid limiting the sample to recipients of certain kinds of
income. It is deflated using a price index for 2006. Furthermore, an equiv-
alent household income (not shown in table V.6) is computed by adjusting
for the number of household members, using the following formula8:
adjusted income =
income
1 + 0.5 · (adults− 1) + 0.3 · kids .
8This is the so called “OECD modified equivalence scale”.
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Figure V.2: Immigration Concerns and Unemployment Rate as a Function
of Survey Year
Source: Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit (2011): Unemployment rate in the civilian labor force
SOEP respondents are asked about different kinds of incomes, but missing
values are not imputed for all income variables. Therefore, dummy variables
indicating whether an individual has a certain kind of income or asset, which
have fewer missing values, are used in most estimations. 46% of respondents
receive some public benefit. 11% declared not to own any assets, including
a savings account. Individuals were asked specifically about financial assets
in 2002 and 2007 only. Out of those observations 48% have some financial
assets.
In addition to years of education, the SOEP provides education data
categorized according to the UNESCO’s international standard classification
of education (ISCED), where those still in education are assigned a value of 0.
The definition of categories 1 to 6 can be found in table V.7 in the appendix.
Categories 3 to 5 are further aggregated into a “medium education” dummy,
whereas categories 1 and 2 on the one hand and 6 on the other hand then
correspond to low and high education, respectively.
Further controls include gender, marital status, the number of kids living
in the household, whether a respondent lives in East or West Germany, immi-
gration background9 and labor force status. Furthermore, political interest
9It is likely that a large share of the immigrants in the voting population sample are
descendants of Germans who automatically received citizenship upon immigration. Out
of the 2, 090 observations with an immigrant background and valid answers on whether
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is included, with 1 meaning very strong and 4 none at all, as are the number
of doctor visits in the three months prior to the interview as a measure for
health or reliance on the health system.
Table V.3 shows the correlation coefficients between age and various other
variables. Older individuals have lower household incomes, even after ac-
counting for the number of household members and they are less likely to
receive public benefits other than pensions. However, they are more likely
to own assets and their financial assets are worth more. They are less satis-
fied with life and worry more, and they also rely more heavily on the health
system.
Age Correlation Coefficient
Equivalent HH income −0.27
HH receives no benefits 0.43
HH owns no assets −0.02
Owns financial assets 0.21
Value financial assets 0.10
Life satisfaction −0.06
Index of concerns 0.10
Doctor visits 0.19
Equivalent household income is real household income, ad-
justed for the number of household members. Benefits include
family allowances, unemployment benefits, care benefits and
welfare, but not pensions. Assets include savings accounts,
building savings contracts, life insurance, bonds, stock and
firm capital. The index of concerns is the average value of
concerns asked in all years to all respondents. The number
of doctor visits in the three months prior to the interview is
reported.
Table V.3: Correlation of Age with Other Variables
The next section extensively discusses results based on stated immigration
concerns. This is the obvious measure for immigration attitudes. However,
the regression results show that the estimated impact of some explanatory
variables on immigration concerns is highly sensitive to whether additional
concerns are included as controls. Including these other areas of concern may
imply endogeneity problems whereas excluding them may induce an omitted
variable bias. The difference between immigration and other concerns as a
measure for immigration attitudes does not suffer from these problems and
is also discussed.
they had a foreign parent only 51% stated to have a foreign parent.
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4 Results
First, the estimation results for stated immigration concerns using ordered
models are presented and compared to the estimation results using OLS.
Whereas a first set of estimations includes time dummies in addition to age,
a second set of estimations includes year of birth instead. Several robustness
checks are discussed. Second, the results of estimating a pooled OLS model of
stated immigration concerns are compared to the results from exploiting the
within variation of the data only. Since time-invariant variables cancel out of
the model in equation (3), only time-variant variables are used in both models
in order to make the results comparable. Thirdly, the difference between
immigration and other concerns is introduced as an alternative measure for
immigration attitudes.
Stated Immigration Concerns: Ordered vs. Linear Mod-
els
As a first step, a regression model with a full set of covariates, including time
dummies, is estimated by pooled OLS, ordered probit and ordered logit.
Age, age squared, age to the power of three and age to the power of four are
included because in regressions without other controls these first four powers
proved to be significant. Table V.8 in the appendix contains a comparison
of the regression results for these models.
The age terms are jointly but not individually significant in all three
models when accounting for a full set of covariates. It is remarkable that age
still has an independent effect on immigration concerns, even though a host
of variables correlated with age like income and life satisfaction are controlled
for. Compared to 1999, individuals were less concerned about immigration
in all years but 2005, the year with the highest unemployment rate in the
sample period.
Since the effect of age on immigration concerns is highly non-linear, it is
best illustrated visually. Figure V.3, based on the ordered probit model,10
shows the predicted probabilities of not being concerned, being somewhat
concerned and being very concerned about immigration for different ages,
for a male married respondent from West Germany who has no migration
background, medium education, is working, does not receive any state ben-
efits and owns some kind of assets. Other variables are set to their means.11
10The corresponding figure for the ordered logit model is available upon request.
11Both the mean probabilities in figures V.3 and V.4 and the statistics in table V.4 were
simulated using the Stata program Clarify, see Tomz, Wittenberg, and King (2003). The
usefulness of these simulations is demonstrated in King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000).
89
Ceteris paribus, predicted immigration concerns increase slightly with
age. Across all ages, the predicted probability of being somewhat concerned
is highest and the probability of not being concerned lowest. The probability
of being very concerned increases slightly up to age 70 and then decreases
markedly. The reverse pattern is observed for the probability of not being
concerned. Immigration concerns thus seem to increase as individuals ap-
proach retirement and decrease only as they approach the end of their lives.
Figure V.3: Effect of Age on the Predicted Probabilities for Immigration
Concerns, Ordered Probit Including Time Dummies
Simulations with Clarify based on table V.8, ordered probit model. Results for the ordered logit model are
available upon request. To simulate the probabilities continuous variables were set to their means. Other
covariates were set to male, married, from West Germany, no immigrant, medium education (ISCED
3/4/5), working, not receiving any state benefits but owning some kind of assets.
However, being retired instead of working has no significant effect on
immigration attitudes, see table V.8. Neither do unemployed individuals
voice more concerns, which is in line with the literature. Individuals who are
in education, working irregularly or not in the labor force are less concerned
about immigration. For the first and last group labor market competition
from potential immigrants is obviously not an issue. Furthermore, individuals
from all three groups are likely to have low incomes and therefore pay low
welfare state contributions. If an increase in welfare costs due to immigration
entails higher contributions rather than lower benefits, it makes sense that
individuals with low incomes are less concerned.
This presumption is confirmed by the significantly positive coefficient of
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household income: individuals in households with higher (equivalent) in-
comes are more concerned about immigration. Individuals who do not them-
selves benefit from any kind of state support and individuals who rely rela-
tively little on the health system, proxied by the number of doctor visits, are
also more concerned.
Labor market competition from immigrants seems to be more of an issue
for natives with low education, who are significantly more concerned than
those who have not yet completed their education, the reference category.
Highly educated natives are significantly less concerned while those with
medium education do not differ significantly from those who have not yet
completed their education. This result is in line with labor market concerns
about actual immigration patterns in Germany (immigrants have on average
lower education than natives), but also with political correctness among the
highly educated, as argued above.
The hypothesis that individuals with capital holdings favor immigration
(presumably because it implies an increase in labor supply) is also confirmed.
Individuals who do not own any assets are significantly more concerned about
immigration than those who do own some assets. Admittedly, the dummy for
household asset ownership is a very crude measure for wealth or capital hold-
ings. The impact of other wealth indicators is discussed below, confirming
the result that wealthy individuals are less opposed to immigration.
Immigrant workers, although nationalized, tend to be most negatively
affected by further immigration, see, for instance, Ottaviano and Peri (2008).
However, they can also be expected to have the smallest cultural distance to
new immigrants. Since Dustmann and Preston (2007) find cultural distance
to be a powerful predictor of opposition to immigration it is not surprising
that immigrants state significantly less concerns.
Quite remarkable is the finding that being East German reduces concerns
about immigration. In fact, East Germans are on average more concerned
than West Germans, and the difference is significant. Living in the East has a
positive effect on immigration concerns in univariate regressions. The effect
of living in the East changes its sign when controlling for other concerns.
This implies that the opposition of East Germans to immigration is due
to different (observable) characteristics. Most importantly, East German
respondents are generally more concerned than West German respondents,
and East Germans with the same level of average concerns as West Germans
are at least less likely to voice concerns about immigration.
In general, those who worry more also worry more about immigration,
with the exception of concerns about the environment and world peace, two
issues about which individuals on the left of the political spectrum are more
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likely to worry.12 Concerns about crime are the strongest predictor of con-
cerns about immigration, followed by concerns about general economic devel-
opment. Concerns about one’s own economic situation are far less important,
a result also in line with the literature, see, e.g., Citrin et al. (1997).
The estimation results for these respondent characteristics are similar
when including year of birth as a control variable instead of the time dum-
mies. Therefore, table V.9 only shows the estimated coefficients for the age
terms and for year of birth. Before examining differences in the estimated
age pattern of immigration concerns compared to figure V.3, the quantitative
importance of selected other variables is discussed based on table V.4. This
table reports the predicted probability of not being concerned, being some-
what concerned and being very concerned about immigration for the model
which includes year of birth as a control. These predicted probabilities are
calculated for a male married respondent from West Germany who has no
migration background, medium education, is working, does not receive any
state benefits and owns some kind of assets, whereas other variables are set
to their means.
Economic variables like income and asset ownership turn out to have quite
a weak effect on immigration concerns. Reliance on the health system is more
important, and the effect of a change in labor force status from “working” to
“in education” is also stronger, see table V.4. Education has an even stronger
effect, with the highly educated 11 percentage points more likely not to be
concerned and 15 percentage points less likely to be very concerned than those
with low education. The strong negative effect of immigration background on
concerns about immigration clearly mandates a cultural rather than economic
interpretation. It is about as strong as the effect of education. Meanwhile,
the effect of life satisfaction is quite weak.
The four age terms are still jointly but not individually significant, see
table V.9. However, there is a sign change in the estimated coefficient for
age, which is now positive. The estimated coefficient for year of birth is also
positive, indicating that ceteris paribus younger cohorts are more averse to
immigration. Table V.4 shows a pronounced difference between the youngest
and oldest cohort in the sample: ceteris paribus the youngest individuals
are predicted to be 17 percentage points less likely not to be concerned and
more than 25 percentage points more likely to be very concerned than the
oldest individuals. Consequently, the age pattern of predicted immigration
concerns is far more pronounced when holding constant year of birth than
when holding constant survey year, see figure V.4.
12Surprisingly, the same does not hold for being concerned about the situation of for-
eigners in Germany.
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Change Probability Probability Probability
from of not being of being somewhat of being very
Variable to concerned concerned concerned
East German no 0.011 0.007 −0.018
yes (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
[0.006; 0.016] [0.004; 0.011] [−0.027;−0.009]
Immigrant no 0.113 0.029 −0.141
yes (0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
[0.100; 0.124] [0.025; 0.033] [−0.153;−0.129]
Education low 0.110 0.041 −0.151
high (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
[0.100; 0.120] [0.035; 0.047] [−0.164;−0.138]
Labor working 0.057 0.026 −0.082
force status in education (0.007) (0.002) (0.009)
[0.043; 0.070] [0.021; 0.030] [−0.099;−0.065]
Income mean −0.010 −0.008 0.018
max (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
[−0.015;−0.006] [−0.012;−0.004] [0.010; 0.027]
Benefits no 0.007 0.005 −0.012
yes (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
[0.002; 0.012] [0.001; 0.008] [−0.020;−0.003]
Assets yes −0.008 −0.006 0.014
no (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
[−0.014;−0.003] [−0.011;−0.002] [0.005; 0.025]
Political mean 0.033 0.018 −0.051
interest very strong (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
[0.028; 0.037] [0.016; 0.021] [−0.058;−0.044]
Life mean 0.010 0.007 −0.017
satisfaction max (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
[0.007; 0.014] [0.005; 0.009] [−0.023;−0.012]
Doctor mean 0.092 0.028 −0.120
visits max (0.027) (0.003) (0.027)
[0.043; 0.148] [0.020; 0.033] [−0.171;−0.066]
Year min −0.169 −0.085 0.254
of birth max (0.025) (0.008) (0.033)
[−0.217;−0.119] [−0.101;−0.067] [0.186; 0.315]
Mean effect, standard error in parentheses and 95% confidence interval in brackets. Simulations
with Clarify based on table V.9, ordered probit model. Results for the ordered logit model are
available upon request. To simulate the probabilities continuous variables were set to their means.
Other covariates were set to male, married, from West Germany, no immigrant, medium education
(ISCED3/4/5), working, not receiving any state benefits but owning some kind of assets.
Table V.4: Effect of Changes in Various Explanatory Variables on the Pre-
dicted Probabilities for Immigration Concerns, Ordered Probit
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Figure V.4: Effect of Age on the Predicted Probabilities for Immigration
Concerns, Ordered Probit Including Year of Birth
Simulations with Clarify based on table V.9, ordered probit model. Results for the ordered logit model are
available upon request. To simulate the probabilities continuous variables were set to their means. Other
covariates were set to male, married, from West Germany, no immigrant, medium education (ISCED
3/4/5), working, not receiving any state benefits but owning some kind of assets.
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The probability of being very concerned now increases up to age 80 and
is still quite high at age 90. Age appears to be quite a strong predictor of
immigration concerns: ceteris paribus an 80 year old is predicted to have
an about 10 percentage points lower probability of not being concerned and
an almost 20 percentage points higher probability of being very concerned
than a 20 year old. The comparison of figures V.3 and V.4 yields evidence
for distinct life cycle and cohort effects on immigration attitudes. Whereas
older cohorts seem to be less concerned about immigration, concerns grow
over the life cycle.
Table V.8 has shown that there are significant differences in immigration
concerns across different years. As a robustness check, separate ordered pro-
bit models are estimated for each year.13 Since age and year of birth are
perfectly collinear in each cross section, year of birth has to be excluded.
The estimated age effect thus confounds life cycle and cohort. The four age
terms are jointly significant in seven out of ten years. There is no time trend,
however. Being highly educated is significant in all years, as are immigration
background, gender, political interest and most concerns. All other variables
turn insignificant in some years. Also, being unemployed significantly en-
hances immigration concerns in 2005 and 2006. Since unemployment rose in
2005, it is likely that individuals who became unemployed voiced significantly
higher concerns.
An additional robustness check is estimating separate regressions for East
and West Germany. The age effect is estimated with far less precision for East
Germany. Since birth rates are much lower in East Germany, this confirms
the finding by Ivlevs () that age is less significant in regions with low birth
rates.
Additionally including a dummy for personal ownership of financial assets
reveals that people who own financial assets are less concerned. However, the
value of financial assets has no significant effect on immigration concerns.
The four age terms are still jointly significant when controlling for ownership
of financial assets.
Table V.10 shows detailed regressions results for replacing the “no assets”
dummy by dummy variables for the ownership of different types of assets.
These types are savings accounts, building loans, life insurance, bonds, firm
capital and stocks. Whereas ownership of firm capital or stocks diminishes
immigration concerns, ownership of bonds or building loans enhances them.
The difference between bond and stock holders is their willingness to take
risks, likely to be positively correlated with general open-mindedness, but
13The estimation results for this and the following two robustness checks are available
upon request.
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also their financial literacy, positively correlated with education. However,
education is still highly significant. Furthermore, the value of firm capital
is most clearly positively affected by an increase of domestic labor supply,
whereas the returns on bonds and building loans may not be related to labor
supply at all. The difference between different types of assets is thus in line
with the theoretical results sketched in section 2.
The signs and significance levels are the same across all three models in
tables V.8 and V.9. The sole problem with OLS is then that the quantita-
tive interpretation of the estimated coefficients need not make much sense.
Nonetheless, figures based on the estimated coefficients from the linear mod-
els are instructive because they confirm marked differences between life cycle
and cohort effects on immigration attitudes.
Figure V.5 shows the derivative of immigration concerns with respect to
age and its 95% confidence interval. This is the combined marginal effect of
all four age terms. The left panel represents the OLS model which includes
time dummies as controls and the right panel shows the model which includes
year of birth. Whereas in the model with time dummies, the marginal effect
of age on immigration concerns is significantly positive for a limited range of
ages only, it is positive up to age 80 and above when controlling for year of
birth. Note, however, that the figure only ranges from age 18 to age 85. For
very old ages, the marginal effect of age is subject to a lot of uncertainty.
Figure V.5: Marginal Effect of Age on Immigration Concerns, OLS Including
Time Dummies vs. Including Year of Birth
In summary, immigration concerns differ across time and between differ-
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ent cohorts of individuals. There is also quite a strong life-cycle effect on
immigration concerns with individuals growing more concerned up to age 80.
However, age does not have a significant impact on stated immigration con-
cerns in all years, and the age effect is estimated with less precision for East
than for West Germany. Highly educated individuals are least concerned
about immigration. Other labor market and welfare state related variables
are also significant but quantitatively less important. Owners of assets with
variable returns, like firm capital and stocks, voice significantly less concerns
about immigration. Among the non-economic variables, own immigration
background has the strongest positive impact on immigration attitudes.
Stated Immigration Concerns: Within-Transformed Model
As an alternative way of isolating the effect of growing older on immigration
concerns, a model which only uses the within variation of the data, as in
equation (3), is compared to a pooled OLS model with a full set of time
variant controls. The within or FE model has the additional advantage that
it eliminates any unobserved heterogeneity between individuals which is time-
invariant. For these comparisons only individuals who remained in the panel
for at least two years are used.
Table V.11 in the appendix displays complete regression results. The first
column shows estimation results for OLS, leaving out the explanatory vari-
ables with little or no time variation (gender, immigration background, both
year of birth and time dummies, and living in East Germany). The number
of person-year observations is reduced only slightly to 171, 636. Furthermore,
the overall R2 , the signs and significance levels are comparable to the first
column of table V.8.14
Individuals remained on average 5.9 years in the sample, and the number
of individuals who spent at least two years in the panel is 29, 299, such that
it should be possible to detect significant life cycle effects. However, some
variables vary very little over the life cycle. Therefore, it is not surprising
that the within model has fewer significant coefficients than the pooled OLS
model. The four age terms are jointly significant in both models.
Figure V.6 illustrates the derivative of immigration concerns with respect
to age for the OLS and within models up to age 85. In the OLS model, age
has a significantly positive (enhancing) effect on concerns between ages 40
and 60. Over the life cycle, growing older enhances immigration concerns up
to age 80 almost and it is significant at the 5% level for a much larger range
14Only concerns about the environment turn insignificant, whereas being on maternity
leave turns significant. The sizes of the estimated coefficients change slightly.
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of ages, see the right panel of figure V.6. This is in line with the ordered
models and also with the pooled OLS model which includes birth year as a
control, see figure V.5.
Figure V.6: Marginal Effect of Age on Immigration Concerns, OLS vs. FE
Although the differences between the two columns in table V.11 may
indicate that unobserved individual heterogeneity is indeed a problem, the
difference in the estimated effect of age on immigration concerns is similar
to the one which is observed when comparing models with and without year
of birth as in figure V.5: whereas in a pooled OLS model, the estimated
effect of age confounds growing older with belonging to a given cohort, the
FE model isolates the effect of growing older.
There are some additional differences. The asset ownership dummy turns
insignificant in the within estimation. However, a robustness check (not dis-
played) has shown ownership of individual financial assets to be significant
over the life cycle. The argument that capital owners are less opposed to
immigration thus still seems to be valid. The impact of welfare state con-
cerns is partly confirmed: whereas the dummy for receiving state support is
significant in both specifications, income apparently has no effect over the
life cycle. Furthermore, individuals become less opposed as they rely more
heavily on the health system.
Life satisfaction and other concerns also have life cycle effects, with some
notable differences for different areas of concerns: individuals who become
more concerned over the life cycle in any area also become more concerned
about immigration. Some variables with little within variation such as mar-
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ital status, education and political interest are not significant over the life
cycle.
Figure V.7 illustrates the predicted value of immigration concerns as a
function of age, based on the sample distribution of respondent character-
istics by age, also up to age 85. The OLS model predicts a hump-shaped
age profile, with immigration concerns most pronounced among the 70 year
olds. Immigration concerns over the life cycle are predicted to increase more
sharply. A predicted value of 2 corresponds to being somewhat concerned.
The predicted value for the youngest individuals is about 1.8. Predicted
concerns reach a peak of about 2.2, also around age 70, and then decrease.
Despite changes in other characteristics over the life cycle, such as reliance
on social security, older individuals thus seem to feel more concerned about
immigration attitudes well into their retirement.
Figure V.7: Predicted Immigration Concerns by Age, OLS vs. FE
Difference in concerns
This section introduces an alternative measure for immigration concerns.
As discussed in section 3, immigration concerns are highly correlated with
other areas of concerns and also follow a similar age profile. Furthermore,
immigration and other concerns are likely to be jointly determined, such that
it is difficult to argue that being concerned about some other issue has an
exogenous impact on immigration concerns.
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The first column of table V.12 in the appendix replicates the complete re-
gression results for the OLS model of stated immigration concerns with year
of birth included as a control. The second column excludes other concerns as
explanatory variables. Indeed, the model’s explanatory power decreases quite
sharply.15 There are a few sign changes, suggesting that immigration con-
cerns measure more than just general worries. However, these sign changes
may also indicate that the two regressions are affected by endogeneity and
omitted variable bias, respectively.
East Germans tend to voice more concerns than West Germans, includ-
ing more concerns about immigration. Being East German thus significantly
enhances immigration concerns when other concerns are not accounted for.
Given other concerns, being East German reduces stated immigration con-
cerns. A similar effect is observed for the number of doctor visits: individ-
uals who visit a doctor more frequently voice more immigration concerns,
presumably because they are generally more concerned. When controlling
for other concerns, individuals with a higher number of doctor visits in the
three months prior to the interview stated less concerns about immigration.
Furthermore, household income turns insignificant as other concerns are ex-
cluded. Whereas respondents with higher incomes have less reason to be
concerned, concerns about the fiscal impact of immigration increase with
income, given other concerns.
The comparison of the first two columns of table V.12 also shows that
the estimated age pattern is strongly affected by the inclusion of other con-
cerns as controls. Year of birth is significant with the opposite sign when
excluding other concerns. That is, younger generations are estimated to be
less concerned about immigration.
The marginal effect of age also changes somewhat, see figure V.8. In both
models the age effect is estimated with little precision below age 30. However,
there are also significant differences. When excluding other concerns the age
effect turns negative for somewhat younger ages (around age 70), and the
estimated negative effect for older ages is much stronger than in the model
which includes other concerns.
These changes could in principle be related to the strong multicollinearity
between age and year of birth since excluding other concerns leads to a neg-
ative effect of birth year on immigration concerns but at the same time to a
stronger negative effect of age for very old ages, see figure V.8. However, this
does not seem to be the problem, as a robustness check revealed: FE models
15Adding selected variables like the frequency of eating out, or a dummy for whether
someone has a foreign parent, did not increase explanatory power much. Political party
preference was found to increase explanatory power but is likely to suffer from similar
endogeneity problems as different areas of concerns.
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Figure V.8: Marginal Effect of Age on Immigration Concerns, OLS Including
vs. Excluding Other Concerns
of stated immigration concerns were compared to between effects (BE) mod-
els, which only use the variation between individuals. These regressions were
run on the sample of individuals who remained in the panel for the whole
ten-year period. The estimated age effect in the BE models then corresponds
to a cohort effect. The BE models additionally allows for non-linearities in
the cohort effect.
However, the estimated cohort effect is not consistent across the two
models with and without other concerns excluded either.16 The distinct
estimated age and cohort effects are thus not robust to the exclusion of
additional concerns.
To circumvent possible biases while separating immigration from other
concerns, the difference between immigration concerns and average concerns
is used as a measure for immigration attitudes. This variable has over 30
different outcomes between −2 and 2 such that linear models seem appro-
priate. For about 10% of individuals the value of average concerns is exactly
equal to the value of immigration concerns.
The third and fourth column of table V.12 show regression results for the
difference between immigration and average concerns. Whereas the third
column includes year of birth as a control, the fourth column includes time
dummies. There are no large differences in the estimated coefficients between
16These regression results are available upon request.
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the two models. Furthermore, many of the variables that have a significant
impact on stated immigration concerns also have a significant impact on this
alternative measure of immigration attitudes. There are a few exceptions.
Being East German, the frequency of doctor visits and household in-
come are significant with the same sign as in the model which includes other
concerns as controls in the first column, confirming the above discussion.
Additionally, higher life satisfaction reduces the relative prominence of im-
migration concerns. Individuals with low life satisfaction are likely to worry
about other things than immigration. However, year of birth is still signifi-
cant with the opposite sign. Older cohorts thus seem to be more concerned
about immigration than about other issues. At the same time growing older
lessens concerns about immigration relative to other concerns, see the left
panel of figure V.9.
Figure V.9: Marginal Effect of Age on the Difference between Immigration
and Other Concerns, OLS Including Year of Birth vs. Including Time Dum-
mies
The comparison with the estimated age pattern from the model with
time dummies instead of year of birth, see the right panel of figure V.9,
confirms the existence of distinct cohort and life cycle effects. In this model
age significantly enhances the importance of immigration relative to other
issues individuals may be concerned about, at least between ages 40 and
70. The estimated age coefficients are likely to capture the negative effect of
birth year. The fourth column shows that immigration concerns were most
prominent relative to other issues in the base year 1999, and least prominent
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in 2003. Note that 2003 was the year of the Iraq war and also the year
far-reaching labor market reforms were passed in Germany.
As a robustness check on the estimated age pattern, a within-transformed
model of the difference in concerns is estimated and compared to the OLS
model. Regression results can be found in table V.13 in the appendix. Figure
V.10 shows the marginal effect of age on the difference in concerns in the two
models. The age pattern is consistent with figure V.9: whereas the OLS
model which excludes both year of birth and time dummies estimates an
enhancing effect of age on the new measure of immigration concerns, the FE
model in the right panel shows a decline in immigration concerns over the
life cycle.
Figure V.10: Marginal Effect of Age on the Difference between Immigration
and Other Concerns, OLS vs. FE
The predicted difference in concerns based on the sample distribution of
respondent characteristics is negative for all ages as figure V.11 shows. Note
that observed average concerns are also more pronounced than immigration
concerns for all ages, see figure V.1. The OLS model predicts an increase in
the relative importance of immigration concerns with age, with a few dips in
between. The dip in concerns about immigration relative to other concerns
past age 60 is quite interesting. In terms of birth year, these are the cohorts
born shortly after World War Two. These cohorts may also be the first to
enter retirement worrying about the future of pensions.
Over the life cycle, individuals are predicted to be most concerned about
immigration when they are young and least concerned when they are old.
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Figure V.11: Predicted Difference in Concerns by Age, OLS vs. FE
There is a slight increase in concerns between ages 40 and 60, but around
age 60, predicted concerns are still much lower than around age 20.
In summary, using the difference between immigration and other concerns
as a measure for immigration attitudes leads to predictions concerning the
impact of growing older and belonging to a given cohort which are contrary
to the predictions based on using stated immigration concerns. Over the life
cycle, stated immigration concerns are found to increase well into retirement
and decrease only as individuals approach the end of their lives. Meanwhile,
relative to other areas of concerns immigration concerns decrease over the
life cycle. Among older cohorts immigration is more prominent relative to
other issues than among young cohorts. However, the cohort effect on stated
immigration concerns is not robust.
5 Conclusion
This analysis has attempted to disentangle the effect of individual age on
immigration attitudes from cohort and time effects to answer the question
whether people grow more averse to immigration over the life cycle. To
achieve this goal the paper followed two approaches. Firstly, year of birth
was included as a control in addition to individual age. Time dummies were
also included in some regressions instead of year of birth. Secondly, models
which use the within variation of the data only were estimated. Furthermore,
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two different measures of immigration attitudes were analyzed.
Several presumptions concerning the impact of different individual char-
acteristics correlated with age were derived from previous theoretical re-
search. Firstly, older individuals who draw larger shares of their income
from (domestic) capital were presumed to be in favor of labor inflows. This
presumption was not borne out for ownership of all types of capital, but
confirmed for firm capital, stocks and financial assets in general.
Secondly, older individuals were presumed to be less concerned about
possible changes in the political balance induced by immigration. Indeed,
stated immigration concerns were found to decrease strongly after age 80
whereas relative to other concerns immigration concerns decrease over most
of the life cycle.
Thirdly, even with flexible pension benefits pensioners do not necessarily
favor labor immigration since it has offsetting effects on the level of wages and
the number of contributors. Workers may favor labor immigration if pension
contributions are adjustable to keep benefits stable. In fact, no significant
difference between workers’ and pensioners’ attitudes was found, whereas
individuals outside the labor market for other reasons were found to be less
averse to immigration.
Fourthly, the contributors to welfare were presumed to be more opposed
to immigration than beneficiaries, assuming that welfare contributions rather
than benefits are adjustable. This presumption was also borne out: for
given education levels, individuals with high incomes were found to be more
concerned, whereas those who benefit from some kind of state support or who
rely relatively heavily on the health system were found to be less concerned.
The predicted age profile of stated immigration concerns and of the dif-
ference between immigration and other concerns is non-linear. Over the life
cycle, individuals are predicted to state the highest concerns in their seven-
ties. However, relative to other issues, immigration causes most concerns at
young ages.
At the same time, older cohorts were found to be more concerned about
immigration than about other issues. The effect of birth year on stated
immigration concerns is not consistent over different specifications Survey
year also turned out to significantly influence immigration attitudes with
stated immigration concerns highest when unemployment is high.
The regressions which include other areas of concerns as explanatory vari-
ables seemed to suffer from endogeneity problems. However, excluding these
other areas of concern may lead to an omitted-variable bias. Additionally,
the share of the variance in stated immigration concerns explained by the
other controls is quite low. The findings in this paper thus suggest extending
the analysis by including additional variables, although this would come at
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the cost of reducing the sample to non-random subsamples. Possibly, valid
exclusion restrictions for each area of concern could be found.
Although no pre-programed routines exist for estimating within-trans-
formations of ordered models, incorporating within-transformations is pos-
sible under certain assumptions, see, e.g., Frijters and Geishecker (2008).
Finally, the SOEP data can be disaggregated regionally when extended se-
curity provisions are satisfied. Linking the data to regional birth rates would
make it possible to verify the finding by Ivlevs (), that individuals in areas
with lower birth rates are less concerned about immigration, for Germany.
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Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Demographic characteristics
Age 179, 828 47.90 17.43 18 100
Male 179, 828 0.48 0.50 0 1
Married 179, 828 0.60 0.49 0 1
Number kids in HH 179, 828 0.51 0.88 0 10
East German 179, 828 0.27 0.45 0 1
Immigrant 179, 828 0.06 0.24 0 1
Education
Education (ISCED) 176, 399 3.51 1.42 0 6
Labor force status
Working 179, 828 0.59 0.49 0 1
Retired 179, 828 0.18 0.39 0 1
In education 179, 828 0.03 0.17 0 1
Unemployed 179, 828 0.05 0.22 0 1
On maternity leave 179, 828 0.02 0.13 0 1
Working irregularly 179, 828 0.02 0.15 0 1
Not working (other) 179, 828 0.11 0.31 0 1
Income
Gross HH income (yearly) 179, 828 39513.95 38352.18 0 1, 032, 387
HH receives no benefits 178, 935 0.54 0.50 0 1
Assets
HH owns no assets 178, 241 0.11 0.31 0 1
HH owns savings account 156, 047 0.88 0.33 0 1
HH owns bonds 55, 914 0.66 0.47 0 1
HH owns stocks 64, 793 0.71 0.46 0 1
HH owns firm capital 28, 957 0.34 0.48 0 1
HH owns building savings contract 179, 701 0.45 0.50 0 1
HH owns life insurance 179, 701 0.57 0.50 0 1
Owns financial assets 35, 379 0.48 0.50 0 1
Value financial assets 13, 881 31, 524 111, 887 1 6, 000, 000
Other variables
Political interest 179, 616 2.69 0.80 1 4
Life satisfaction 179, 539 6.93 1.78 0 10
Doctor visits (last 3 months) 179, 202 2.58 4.14 0 99
Household income is deflated to 2006. Political interest ranges from 1 (very strong) to 4 (none at all).
Table V.6: Summary Statistics for Control Variables
Value Definition
1 Primary education or first stage of basic education
2 Lower secondary or second stage of basic education
3 (Upper) secondary education
4 Post-secondary non-tertiary education
5 First stage of tertiary education
6 Second stage of tertiary education
Table V.7: International Standard Classification of Education
B Detailed Regression Results
Immigration concerns OLS Ordered Probit Ordered Logit
Age -0.00336 -0.00618 -0.0130
(0.0113) (0.0210) (0.0356)
Age2 0.0000204 0.0000315 0.000175
(0.000361) (0.000673) (0.00114)
Age3 0.00000131 0.00000256 0.00000217
(0.00000482) (0.00000899) (0.0000152)
Age4 -1.38e-08 -2.65e-08 -3.25e-08
(2.27e-08) (4.24e-08) (7.19e-08)
2000 -0.0803*** -0.149*** -0.250***
(0.00629) (0.0117) (0.0199)
2001 -0.160*** -0.294*** -0.495***
(0.00653) (0.0121) (0.0206)
2002 -0.0997*** -0.185*** -0.314***
(0.00657) (0.0122) (0.0208)
2003 -0.160*** -0.294*** -0.499***
(0.00695) (0.0129) (0.0220)
2004 -0.0637*** -0.117*** -0.199***
(0.00693) (0.0129) (0.0220)
2005 -0.00117 -0.0000432 -0.0000484
(0.00698) (0.0132) (0.0223)
2006 -0.0287*** -0.0526*** -0.0841***
(0.00697) (0.0130) (0.0221)
2007 -0.0461*** -0.0849*** -0.143***
(0.00713) (0.0133) (0.0226)
2008 -0.0972*** -0.181*** -0.300***
(0.00714) (0.0133) (0.0226)
Male 0.0869*** 0.163*** 0.278***
(0.00575) (0.0107) (0.0181)
Married 0.0384*** 0.0705*** 0.119***
continued on next page
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The models account for clustering at
the individual level. HH income is the natural logarithm of real household income, adjusted for the number
of household members. The reference category for education is “in school”. The reference category for labor
force status is “working”. Political interest ranges from 1 (very strong) to 4 (none at all).
continued from previous page
Immigration concerns OLS Ordered Probit Ordered Logit
(0.00652) (0.0121) (0.0205)
Number kids in HH -0.0205*** -0.0382*** -0.0646***
(0.00371) (0.00689) (0.0117)
East German -0.0265*** -0.0513*** -0.0887***
(0.00678) (0.0125) (0.0213)
Immigrant -0.235*** -0.429*** -0.720***
(0.0108) (0.0200) (0.0340)
Isced 1 2 0.0536*** 0.0962*** 0.177***
(0.0191) (0.0358) (0.0613)
Isced 3 4 5 0.0173 0.0289 0.0625
(0.0191) (0.0358) (0.0613)
Isced 6 -0.188*** -0.349*** -0.578***
(0.0208) (0.0389) (0.0665)
Retired -0.00292 -0.00544 -0.00676
(0.0125) (0.0233) (0.0393)
In education -0.128*** -0.239*** -0.407***
(0.0138) (0.0260) (0.0445)
Unemployed 0.000433 -0.000232 -0.00589
(0.00959) (0.0179) (0.0306)
On maternity leave -0.0149 -0.0263 -0.0460
(0.0144) (0.0265) (0.0447)
Working irregularly -0.0385*** -0.0700*** -0.120***
(0.0128) (0.0236) (0.0404)
Not working (other) -0.0150* -0.0288* -0.0499*
(0.00865) (0.0160) (0.0270)
HH income 0.00506*** 0.00953*** 0.0152***
(0.00127) (0.00238) (0.00402)
Receives no benefits 0.0175*** 0.0319*** 0.0551***
(0.00635) (0.0118) (0.0200)
Owns no assets 0.0196*** 0.0368*** 0.0658***
(0.00735) (0.0139) (0.0235)
Political interest 0.0442*** 0.0824*** 0.137***
(0.00339) (0.00639) (0.0109)
Life satisfaction -0.00834*** -0.0156*** -0.0264***
(0.00139) (0.00262) (0.00445)
Doctor visits -0.00181*** -0.00342*** -0.00592***
(0.000497) (0.000928) (0.00160)
Concerns
Economic Development 0.173*** 0.322*** 0.554***
(0.00380) (0.00706) (0.0122)
Environment -0.0127*** -0.0213*** -0.0373***
(0.00423) (0.00792) (0.0136)
Peace -0.0316*** -0.0594*** -0.107***
(0.00388) (0.00720) (0.0124)
Crime 0.409*** 0.742*** 1.296***
continued on next page
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The models account for clustering at
the individual level. HH income is the natural logarithm of real household income, adjusted for the number
of household members. The reference category for education is “in school”. The reference category for labor
force status is “working”. Political interest ranges from 1 (very strong) to 4 (none at all).
continued from previous page
Immigration concerns OLS Ordered Probit Ordered Logit
(0.00401) (0.00771) (0.0135)
Foreigner situation 0.0857*** 0.162*** 0.283***
(0.00398) (0.00754) (0.0132)
Own economic situation 0.0604*** 0.113*** 0.192***
(0.00370) (0.00687) (0.0117)
Own health 0.0373*** 0.0699*** 0.118***
(0.00377) (0.00699) (0.0119)
Constant 0.437***
(0.121)
γ1 2.127*** 3.676***
(0.225) (0.383)
γ2 3.639*** 6.262***
(0.225) (0.383)
Observations 171,762 171,762 171,762
(Pseudo) R2 0.270 0.147 0.149
Joint significance F (4, 29424) = 4.79 χ2(4) = 19.28 χ2(4) = 16.54
of all age terms Prob > F = 0.0007 Prob > χ2 = 0.0007 Prob > χ2 = 0.0024
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The models account for clustering at
the individual level. HH income is the natural logarithm of real household income, adjusted for the number
of household members. The reference category for education is “in school”. The reference category for labor
force status is “working”. Political interest ranges from 1 (very strong) to 4 (none at all).
Table V.8: Regression Results for Immigration Concerns, Including Time
Dummies, OLS vs. Non Linear Models
Immigration concerns OLS Ordered Probit Ordered Logit
Age 0.00155 0.00293 0.00204
(0.0113) (0.0209) (0.0355)
Age2 0.00000374 -0.000000720 0.000139
(0.000361) (0.000669) (0.00113)
Age3 0.00000152 0.00000294 0.00000257
(0.00000482) (0.00000894) (0.0000151)
Age4 -1.47e-08 -2.80e-08 -3.40e-08
(2.27e-08) (4.22e-08) (7.13e-08)
Year of birth 0.00442*** 0.00811*** 0.0140***
(0.000607) (0.00113) (0.00190)
Other controls yes yes yes
Observations 171,762 171,762 171,762
(Pseudo) R2 0.265 0.144 0.146
Joint significance F (4, 29424) = 19.21 χ2(4) = 75.36 χ2(4) = 74.20
of all age terms Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > χ2 = 0.0000 Prob > χ2 = 0.0000
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The models account for clustering at
the individual level. The other control variables are the same as in table V.8, excluding time dummies.
Table V.9: Regression Results for Immigration Concerns, Including Year of
Birth, OLS vs. Non Linear Models
Immigration concerns OLS Ordered Probit Ordered Logit
Age 0.0122 0.0231 0.0367
(0.0123) (0.0229) (0.0390)
Age2 -0.00000135 -0.0000179 0.000107
(0.000390) (0.000730) (0.00124)
Age3 0.00000138 0.00000280 0.00000225
(0.00000519) (0.00000972) (0.0000165)
Age4 -1.31e-08 -2.56e-08 -2.90e-08
(2.44e-08) (4.57e-08) (7.77e-08)
Year of birth 0.0144*** 0.0268*** 0.0459***
(0.000756) (0.00142) (0.00241)
HH income 0.00435*** 0.00795*** 0.0130***
(0.00132) (0.00249) (0.00420)
HH receives no benefits 0.0220*** 0.0403*** 0.0681***
(0.00675) (0.0127) (0.0214)
HH owns savings account -0.00914 -0.0168 -0.0319*
(0.00563) (0.0106) (0.0180)
HH owns building loan 0.0168*** 0.0316*** 0.0516***
(0.00548) (0.0102) (0.0173)
HH owns life insurance 0.00667 0.0143 0.0215
(0.00562) (0.0105) (0.0179)
HH owns bonds 0.0178*** 0.0343*** 0.0561***
(0.00610) (0.0113) (0.0191)
HH owns firm capital -0.0298*** -0.0553*** -0.0895**
(0.0113) (0.0211) (0.0359)
HH owns stocks -0.0297*** -0.0537*** -0.0925***
(0.00571) (0.0106) (0.0179)
Other controls yes yes yes
Observations 139,976 139,976 139,976
(Pseudo) R2 0.278 0.152 0.154
Joint significance F (4, 26150) = 95.38 χ2(4)375.22 χ2(4) = 374.87
of all age terms Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > χ2 = 0.0000 Prob > χ2 = 0.0000
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The models account for clustering at the
individual level. The other control variables are the same as in table V.8, excluding time dummies.
Table V.10: Effects of Different Assets on Immigration Concerns, OLS vs.
Non Linear Models
Immigration concerns OLS FE
Age -0.00418 0.00805
(0.0114) (0.0153)
Age2 0.0000149 -0.000267
(0.000366) (0.000486)
Age3 0.00000176 0.00000694
(0.00000488) (0.00000651)
Age4 -1.73e-08 -5.01e-08
(2.30e-08) (3.10e-08)
Married 0.0371*** 0.00584
(0.00658) (0.00862)
Number kids in HH -0.0229*** -0.00833*
(0.00376) (0.00441)
Isced 1 2 0.0450** 0.00294
(0.0194) (0.0227)
Isced 3 4 5 0.0196 0.0202
(0.0194) (0.0217)
Isced 6 -0.190*** 0.0168
(0.0210) (0.0287)
Retired -0.00911 -0.0106
(0.0126) (0.0111)
In education -0.137*** -0.0121
(0.0140) (0.0131)
Unemployed -0.00642 0.00116
(0.00976) (0.00826)
On maternity leave -0.0511*** -0.00175
(0.0144) (0.0121)
Working irregularly -0.0392*** -0.0227**
(0.0129) (0.0105)
Not working (other) -0.0350*** -0.0162**
(0.00866) (0.00791)
HH income 0.00694*** 0.00167
(0.00127) (0.00121)
HH receives no benefits 0.0228*** 0.0104*
(0.00642) (0.00569)
HH owns no assets 0.0175** 0.00375
(0.00751) (0.00653)
Political Interest 0.0289*** -0.00151
(0.00338) (0.00306)
Life satisfaction -0.0104*** -0.00473***
(0.00140) (0.00119)
Doctor visits -0.00208*** -0.00193***
(0.000509) (0.000428)
Concerns
Economic development 0.182*** 0.0913***
(0.00359) (0.00291)
continued on next page
Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The models account for
clustering at the individual level and include a constant. HH income is the natural logarithm of
real household income, adjusted for the number of household members. The reference category for
education is “in school”. The reference category for labor force status is “working”. Political interest
ranges from 1 (very strong) to 4 (none at all).
continued from previous page
Immigration concerns OLS FE
Environment -0.00681 0.0298***
(0.00421) (0.00335)
Peace -0.0493*** 0.0169***
(0.00374) (0.00297)
Crime 0.410*** 0.197***
(0.00397) (0.00336)
Foreigner situation 0.0839*** 0.203***
(0.00400) (0.00318)
Own economic situation 0.0578*** 0.0374***
(0.00371) (0.00308)
Own health 0.0338*** 0.0180***
(0.00381) (0.00316)
Observations 171,636 171,636
Individuals 29,299 29,299
Average time in panel 5.9 5.9
Overall R2 0.256 0.177
Within R2 0.122
Between R2 0.199
Joint significance F (4, 29298) = 5.79 F (4, 29298) = 29.18
of all age terms Prob > F = 0.0001 Prob > F = 0.0000
Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The models account for
clustering at the individual level and include a constant. HH income is the natural logarithm of
real household income, adjusted for the number of household members. The reference category for
education is “in school”. The reference category for labor force status is “working”. Political interest
ranges from 1 (very strong) to 4 (none at all).
Table V.11: Regression Results for Immigration Concerns, OLS vs. FE
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Difference in concerns OLS FE
Age 0.00560 -0.00279
(0.0127) (0.0159)
Age2 -0.000337 -0.000176
(0.000405) (0.000505)
Age3 0.00000691 0.00000589
(0.00000541) (0.00000676)
Age4 -4.19e-08 -4.60e-08
(2.55e-08) (3.22e-08)
Married 0.0427*** 0.00563
(0.00735) (0.00890)
Number kids in HH -0.0167*** -0.00876*
(0.00415) (0.00455)
Isced 1 2 0.0731*** 0.00663
(0.0213) (0.0235)
Isced 3 4 5 0.0408* 0.0284
(0.0213) (0.0226)
Isced 6 -0.197*** 0.0277
(0.0233) (0.0298)
Retired -0.0220 -0.00934
(0.0140) (0.0115)
In education -0.154*** -0.00852
(0.0158) (0.0137)
Unemployed -0.0134 -0.0185**
(0.0105) (0.00855)
On maternity leave -0.0653*** 0.0108
(0.0154) (0.0126)
Working irregularly -0.0752*** -0.0319***
(0.0144) (0.0110)
Not working (other) -0.0443*** -0.0140*
(0.00957) (0.00820)
HH income 0.0114*** 0.00308**
(0.00138) (0.00125)
HH receives no benefits 0.0330*** 0.0138**
(0.00716) (0.00590)
HH owns no assets 0.0127 0.00648
(0.00813) (0.00678)
Political interest 0.0429*** 0.0163***
(0.00387) (0.00317)
Life satisfaction 0.0107*** 0.0112***
(0.00152) (0.00121)
Doctor visits -0.00748*** -0.00476***
(0.000554) (0.000445)
continued on next page
Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The models account for
clustering at the individual level and include a constant. HH income is the natural logarithm of
real household income, adjusted for the number of household members. The reference category for
education is “in school”. The reference category for labor force status is “working”. Political interest
ranges from 1 (very strong) to 4 (none at all).
continued from previous page
Difference in concerns OLS FE
Observations 171,636 171,636
Individuals 29,299 29,299
Average time in panel 5.9 5.9
Overall R2 0.031 0.002
Within R2 0.003
Between R2 0.001
Joint significance F (4, 29298) = 9.16 F (4, 29298) = 9.19
of all age terms Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000
Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The models account for
clustering at the individual level and include a constant. HH income is the natural logarithm of
real household income, adjusted for the number of household members. The reference category for
education is “in school”. The reference category for labor force status is “working”. Political interest
ranges from 1 (very strong) to 4 (none at all).
Table V.13: Regression Results for the Difference in Concerns, OLS vs. FE
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